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The Tax Ladder: methodology and sources

Methodology and sources for The Tax Ladder · last reviewed

Every number the tool displays resolves to a file in learn/tax-explorer/data/, and every one of those files stores the verbatim line from the source it came from. The tool strips those quotes to keep its own weight down. This page is where they live.

How to read this page. The narrative sections come first: the four calculations the tool performs that are its own rather than a scorekeeper's, the one validation it promised and did not complete, the baseline problem that sits under almost every published score in circulation, and the list of things the tool will not say. The tables at the end are the raw provenance — parameter, value, period, source, and the exact sentence it was read from.

The ten-year convention

Two kinds of number appear in the sandbox, and they are produced in different ways.

Pre-scored reforms — closing a loophole, adding a value-added tax, restoring enforcement funding — take the published conventional score directly, over whatever budget window its scorekeeper used. Those windows differ between sources and are printed beside every figure. A conventional score already contains the taxpayer response; the tool does not apply a second behavioural adjustment on top of one.

Rate changes are computed here, from IRS Statistics of Income Table 3.5 for tax year 2023, and multiplied by ten. They are not uprated for income growth across the window, which real scorekeepers do. Every self-computed ten-year figure in this tool is therefore smaller than a properly uprated score of the same policy would be. Where a lever's own figure lands below a published estimate of the same idea, that is one of the reasons; when that happens, the panel says so.

Four calculations that are ours

Most of what the engine does is arithmetic on somebody else's published number. Four steps are not. Each is a judgement, each has a direction of bias, and each is labelled in the interface where it does its work.

1. The AGI-class to CBO-group crosswalk

Revenue is computed on tax returns. Distribution is reported for households. The two are not the same population and they are not sorted the same way. IRS Statistics of Income ranks returns by adjusted gross income; the Congressional Budget Office ranks households by income before transfers and taxes, adjusted for household size. A married couple filing jointly is one return and one household; two adults sharing a flat are two returns and two households; and a household of four sits lower in CBO's ranking than a single filer on the same income, while the IRS ranks the two identically.

The engine maps each SOI income class onto CBO's published 2022 group boundaries by overlap, treating income as uniformly spread inside each class, and folds the result onto CBO's six groups. Direction of bias: uniform spreading understates concentration inside the top class, so effects driven by the very highest incomes are, if anything, allocated slightly downward. The distributional chart is a statement about direction and relative magnitude between groups. It is not a year-matched ledger, and the third decimal place of any bar is not meaningful.

2. The corporate capital-income allocation

The corporate incidence dial asks how much of a corporate tax change lands on workers and how much on owners of capital. Moving that dial requires knowing how capital income is distributed across the six groups — and CBO publishes average federal tax rates by source, not a capital-income share by group.

The engine backs the share out of two CBO tables by solving for the capital share implied by the published corporate rate under CBO's own stated incidence assumption, which allocates 25 percent of the corporate tax to labour and 75 percent to capital. In other words: given what CBO says the corporate tax rate is for each group, and given CBO's own split, what capital-income distribution must lie underneath? That solved distribution is what lets the dial move at all. Direction of bias: the derivation is anchored to CBO's assumption, so a user who moves the dial toward the "labour bears most of it" end is applying a different incidence assumption to a distribution that was inferred under CBO's. The further from 25 percent the dial travels, the more approximate the result.

3. Corporate revenue scaled linearly

A change in the corporate rate is scaled linearly from actual FY2025 corporate receipts: half the rate, roughly half the receipts. Direction of bias: real corporate tax bases are not linear in the rate — profit-shifting, loss carryforwards, and entity-choice responses all bend the relationship, and the bend is steeper at higher rates. Large corporate-rate movements are the least reliable figure the sandbox produces, and the further from 21 percent the slider travels, the less the number should be trusted.

4. The revenue-feedback-to-GDP conversion

Published growth-feedback estimates are expressed as a share of a policy's static cost recovered through economic growth. The tool needs an effect on GDP. It converts one to the other using the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget's published ratio — that a policy would need to generate five to six dollars of economic activity for every dollar of cost to be self-financing — and reports the result as a band, never a point.

Direction of bias: this is a linear reading of a published rule of thumb, applied outside the specific case CRFB derived it for. It is the coarsest step in the model, which is why the GDP output is a shaded range with both endpoints labelled by the lens that produced them, and why it is never fed back into the revenue figure. That last decision is structural: it is what makes it impossible for any combination of settings in the sandbox to show a tax cut financing itself.

How the engine is validated

The engine is benchmarked against published conventional scores of comparable reforms from CBO, the Tax Foundation and the Penn Wharton Budget Model. Where the engine's own figure can be compared with one of those, both numbers are shown with the reason they differ. A published-score comparison is a weaker check than a microsimulation cross-run, and it is described that way rather than as a match.

The build plan also called for a cross-run against PolicyEngine, an open-source microsimulation model. That cross-run has not been completed, and no PolicyEngine result appears anywhere in the tool.

One case is specifically excluded even from the substitute check. No cross-check of any kind is claimed for the capital-gains lever, because PolicyEngine does not model realization responses — the thing that dominates the answer for capital gains. The project's data file records the developers' own statement that capital-gains behavioural responses were still being added. A validator that does not model the mechanism cannot validate a lever built on it.

The baseline problem

Public Law 119-21, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, was enacted in July 2025. It made the 2017 individual rate schedule permanent, set the estate exemption at $15 million, and changed the state and local tax deduction.

Almost every published revenue score still in circulation predates it. The Congressional Budget Office's options volume is dated December 2024 and assumed the individual provisions would expire at the end of 2025. They did not. Those scores are stale in direction, not merely in size: measured against a permanent-rates baseline, most revenue-raisers would score higher than their published figure, because there is more revenue left to raise.

This is why a pre-OBBBA label on a score is a correctness question rather than a footnote. A score is a difference between two worlds, and if the world it was differenced against no longer exists, the number means something other than what it appears to mean. Every score datum in this project carries a baseline field, and the interface prints it beside the figure.

Three sources in the entire dataset are post-OBBBA: the Tax Foundation's 2026 Options Guide, the Yale Budget Lab's May 2026 re-estimate of carried interest, and Congressional Research Service report IF13190 of March 2026 on the mortgage interest deduction. Everything else is pre-OBBBA and labelled.

What this tool will not say

The list below is enforced two ways: by a unit test over every string the engine generates, and by a scan of the rendered page and every scenario card.

  1. No tax cut finances itself. Growth effects are computed and displayed, and are never added back into the revenue figure. Verified growth feedback in this dataset runs from about −5 percent to +32 percent of a change's static cost. The arithmetic of getting to 100 percent is set out in the sandbox's own honesty notes.
  2. No point estimate of GDP. The macro output is always a two-ended band, and the endpoints are labelled with the modelling lens that produced them.
  3. No year-by-year macro path. The tool reports a tenth-year effect and a ten-year total. It does not draw a trajectory between them.
  4. No sub-quintile precision. Distribution is reported for quintiles plus the top 1 percent. Finer breakouts exist in the source data for some series and are not used in the chart.
  5. No certainty about tax incidence. Who ultimately bears the corporate tax is disputed; the tool ships a dial with the range of published positions and names the shop at each end.
  6. No optimal-rate claim. The sandbox will show where revenue from a band stops rising. Revenue-maximising is not a recommendation, and the tool does not make one.
  7. No averaging of contested estimates. Where shops disagree, both numbers ship with attribution.
  8. No number without a period. Every dollar figure carries its fiscal year or budget window.
And one thing the tool does say, unprompted. Where a figure could not be verified, the space is left empty and the gap is named. Every such gap is listed under what could not be retrieved, with what would close it.

Every behavioural parameter

These are the dials in the sandbox and the constants behind them. Where a parameter is contested, both positions are in the table and the tool ships them as a range rather than an average.

Behavioural parameters — parameters.json
DatumValuePeriodSource and the line it was read from
eti
verified
Saez, Slemrod & Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, Journal of Economic Literature 50(1), March 2012, pp. 3-50 (secondary)
However, in a 2012 review of the literature, leading scholars argued 'the best available estimates range from 0.12 to 0.40.'
eti.what_it_measures
the elasticity captures not only the hours of work response, but also all other behavioral responses to marginal tax rates
eti.top_earners0.57Diamond & Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax, JEP 25(4), 2011
the optimal top tax rate using the current taxable income base ... would be τ*=1/(1+1.5 x 0.57)=54 percent while the optimal top tax rate using a broader income base ... would be τ*=1/(1+1.5 x 0.17)=80 percent.
eti.jct_own_assumption
blocked
not shipped
This approach is based on empirical research suggesting that taxable income elasticities are lower for lower-income taxpayers than for higher-income taxpayers.
revenue_maximizing_top_rate.credible_critique49 percentBadel, Huggett & Luo, Taxing Top Earners: A Human Capital Perspective, The Economic Journal 130(629), 2020, pp. 1200-1225 (primary)
An established view is that the revenue maximizing top tax rate for the US is approximately 73 percent. In contrast, the revenue maximizing top tax rate is approximately 49 percent in our quantitative human capital model.
capital_gains_realization_elasticity.persistent
verified
-0.72Dowd, McClelland & Muthitacharoen, New Evidence on the Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains, National Tax Journal 68(3), 2015, pp. 511-544 (secondary)
The preferred persistent elasticity estimate is –0.72 and is statistically significant and robust to a number of sensitivity tests.
capital_gains_realization_elasticity.transitory
verified
-1.2Dowd, McClelland & Muthitacharoen, New Evidence on the Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains, CBO Working Paper 2012-09 (primary)
-1.20 with a standard error of 0.35
capital_gains_realization_elasticity.scorekeeper_rev_max_rate
verified
30 percentSarin, Summers, Zidar & Zwick, Rethinking How We Score Capital Gains Tax Reform, BFI Working Paper 2021-10 / Tax Policy and the Economy 36, 2022
The prevailing wisdom among some in the scorekeeping community (e.g., Tax Policy Center, Tax Foundation, Penn Wharton Budget Model) has been that the revenue-maximizing capital gains rate is around 30 percent
capital_gains_realization_elasticity.agersnap_zidar_alternative
verified
Agersnap & Zidar, The Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains and Revenue-Maximizing Rates, NBER Working Paper 27705, 2020 (abstract)
We find that the elasticity of revenues with respect to the tax rate over a ten-year period is -0.5 to -0.3, indicating that capital gains tax cuts do not pay for themselves, and that a 5 percentage point rate increase would yield $18 to $30 billion in annual federal tax revenue. Our long-run estimates yield revenue-maximizing capital gains tax rates of 38 to 47 percent.
fiscal_multipliers.state_dependence.supportsAuerbach & Gorodnichenko, Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy, AEJ: Economic Policy 4(2), May 2012, pp. 1-27 (abstract)
A key issue in current research and policy is the size of fiscal multipliers when the economy is in recession. We provide three insights. First, using regime-switching models, we find large differences in the size of spending multipliers in recessions and expansions with fiscal policy being considerably more effective in recessions than in expansions.
fiscal_multipliers.state_dependence.rejectsRamey & Zubairy, Government Spending Multipliers in Good Times and in Bad: Evidence from US Historical Data, Journal of Political Economy 126(2), 2018, pp. 850-901 (primary)
We investigate whether US government spending multipliers are higher during periods of economic slack or when interest rates are near the zero lower bound. Using new quarterly historical US data covering multiple large wars and deep recessions, we estimate multipliers that are below unity irrespective of the amount of slack in the economy. These results are robust to two leading identification schemes, two different estimation methodologies, and many alternative specifications. In contrast, the results are more mixed for the zero lower bound state, with a few specifications implying multipliers as high as 1.5.
mpc.johnson_parker_souleles
verified
Johnson, Parker & Souleles, Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001, AER 96(5), December 2006, pp. 1589-1610 (abstract)
spent 20 to 40 percent of their rebates on nondurable goods during the three-month period ... roughly two-thirds of their rebates ... responses are larger for households with low liquid wealth or low income
mpc.heterogeneity
corrected
Jappelli & Pistaferri, Fiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity, AEJ: Macroeconomics 6(4), 2014, pp. 107-136 (primary)
The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is 48 percent on average. We also find substantial heterogeneity in the distribution, as households with low cash-on-hand exhibit a much higher MPC than affluent households
labor_supply_elasticity.cbo_reportCBO, How the Supply of Labor Responds to Changes in Fiscal Policy (primary)
the overall substitution elasticity ranges from 0.17 to 0.37, with a central estimate of 0.27
labor_supply_elasticity.cbo_working_paperMcClelland & Mok, A Review of Recent Research on Labor Supply Elasticities, CBO Working Paper 2012-12 (primary)
substitution elasticities for the total population that range from 0.1 to 0.3
labor_supply_elasticity.margins
partial
hours elasticity ... ranges from -0.1 to 0.2 … Estimates of the participation elasticity for lower-income taxpayers eligible for the EITC range from 0.3 to 1.2 … the total substitution elasticity (including both hours and participation effects) appears to range from 0.1 to 0.3 for men and single women and from 0.2 to 0.4 for married women … substitution elasticities tend to be smaller for primary earners with higher earnings because, for them, the effects on participation are smaller … For the bottom 10 percent of earners, the participation component of the elasticity is 0.22, giving them a total substitution elasticity of 0.47
corporate_incidence.shops.0JCT, Modeling the Distribution of Taxes on Business Income (JCX-14-13) (primary)
25 percent of corporate income taxes are borne by domestic labor and 75 percent are borne by owners of domestic capital
corporate_incidence.shops.1CBO, The Distribution of Household Income in 2021, Appendix A (Incidence of Federal Taxes) (primary)
CBO's approach is to allocate 75 percent of corporate income taxes to owners of capital in proportion to their income from interest, dividends, rents, and adjusted capital gains... CBO allocates the remaining 25 percent of corporate income taxes to workers in proportion to their income from labor.
corporate_incidence.shops.2Cronin, Lin, Power & Cooper, Distributing the Corporate Income Tax: Revised U.S. Treasury Methodology, OTA Technical Paper 5 (primary)
82% of the corporate income tax burden is distributed to capital income and 18% is distributed to labor income.
corporate_incidence.shops.3TPC Briefing Book, Who bears the burden of the corporate income tax? (secondary)
investment returns (dividends, interest, capital gains, etc.) bear 80 percent of the burden, with wages and other labor income carrying the remaining 20 percent.
corporate_incidence.shops.4Stephen J. Entin, Labor Bears Much of the Cost of the Corporate Tax, Tax Foundation (primary)
These studies appear to show that labor bears between 50 percent and 100 percent of the burden of the corporate income tax, with 70 percent or higher the most likely outcome.
growth_feedback.anchors.01 to 22CBO, Analyzing the Economic and Budgetary Effects of a 10 Percent Cut in Income Tax Rates (primary)
the budgetary impact of the economic changes was estimated to offset between 1 percent and 22 percent of the revenue loss from the tax cut over the first five years and add as much as 5 percent to that loss or offset as much as 32 percent of it over the second five years.
growth_feedback.anchors.215
According to models that account for both supply-side and demand-side effects, those effects might offset somewhat less than 15 percent of the revenue loss over the first five years.
growth_feedback.anchors.3JCT, Macroeconomic Analysis of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1 (JCX-69-17) (primary)
the overall budgetary effects of changes in economic growth are projected to reduce the deficit by $385 billion during the budget window.
growth_feedback.anchors.425William G. Gale, Brookings, Did the 2017 tax cut pay for itself? (primary)
On average, these models estimated that economic growth effects (the 'dynamic effects') will only offset about a quarter of the 10-year revenue loss associated with the TCJA. ... Excluding the Tax Foundation, which is an outlier in these estimates, drops the average offset to less than 20%.
growth_feedback.anchors.51 to 14CRFB, Tax Cut Extension Only Pays for 1-14% of Itself (primary)
TCJA extension would create dynamic feedback sufficient to offset between 1 percent and 14 percent of its static cost over a decade.
growth_feedback.intuition_pumpCRFB
tax cuts rarely if ever fully pay for themselves. Because taxes capture only a fraction of income and some spending grows with income, a policy would need to produce $5 to $6 of economic activity for every $1 of cost to be self-financing.
growth_feedback.tcja_verdictCRFB, Has TCJA Paid For Itself?
it is almost certainly true that the TCJA meaningfully reduced revenue from where it would have been absent the TCJA.
tcja_four_scores.shops.1
corrected
2018-2028 (ELEVEN years)CBO, How the 2017 Tax Act Affects CBO's Projections (primary)
CBO estimated that the tax act would increase the primary deficit by $1.8 trillion … the feedback is estimated to lower the cumulative primary deficit by about $550 billion … raised projected debt-service costs by roughly $600 billion … The act therefore increases the total projected deficit over the 2018–2028 period by about $1.9 trillion.
tcja_four_scores.shops.2
corrected
2018-2027Penn Wharton Budget Model (primary)
2018-2027 -$2,209 -$1,786 -$2,038 $2,387 $1,941 $2,238
tcja_four_scores.shops.3
verified
2018-2027Tax Foundation (primary)
the plan would decrease federal revenues by $1.47 trillion on a static basis and by $448 billion on a dynamic basis
policyengine_validation.critical_finding_about_policyengineMax Ghenis, Behavioral Responses in PolicyEngine US
we are now working on adding capital gains responses

Every pre-scored reform

Where a policy has been scored by a scorekeeper, the tool uses the published figure rather than recomputing it, and prints the window and the baseline beside it. Read the baseline label before the number.

Tax expenditures, repeal scores and enforcement — expenditures.json
DatumValuePeriodSource and the line it was read from
expenditures.conv_scores.tax_gains_at_death
corrected
536.1 usd_billionsFY2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
source (primary)
Include accrued capital gains in the last income tax return of decedents — 10-year total (2025–2034): -$536.1 billion
expenditures.conv_scores.carryover_basis_only
corrected
196.9 usd_billionsFY2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
source (primary)
Option 51. Change the Taxation of Assets Transferred at Death | 197 to 536
expenditures.conv_scores.employer_health_exclusion_cap
corrected
FY2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
source (primary)
Option 56. Reduce Tax Subsidies for Employment-Based Health Benefits | 521 to 965
expenditures.conv_scores.employer_health_exclusion_cap.alternatives.0521no verbatim line stored
expenditures.conv_scores.employer_health_exclusion_cap.alternatives.1965no verbatim line stored
expenditures.conv_scores.employer_health_exclusion_cap.alternatives.2697no verbatim line stored
expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_199a
corrected
835.7 usd_billions2027-2036
baseline: post-obbba
Tax Foundation 2026 Options Guide, Eliminate the Section 199A Pass-Through Deduction (primary)
Conventional primary deficit change (10-Yr): -$835.7B; Dynamic primary deficit change (10-Yr): -$505.9B
expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_199a.alternative_partialFY2026-2035Penn Wharton Budget Model, Eliminating Excess Benefits from Section 199A
options to remove the excess benefit while maintaining the 20 percent tax benefit could raise between $46B and $178B over the 10-year budget window
expenditures.conv_scores.eliminate_itemized_deductions
corrected
FY2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
source (primary)
Option 49. Eliminate or Limit Itemized Deductions | 736 to 3,424
expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_mortgage_interest_deduction
corrected
495 usd_billionsFY2026-2035
baseline: post-obbba
CRS In Focus IF13190, Reforms to the Mortgage Interest Deduction with Revenue Estimates (primary)
Repeal MID — $495 billion
expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_mortgage_interest_deduction.partial_reforms.0368no verbatim line stored
expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_mortgage_interest_deduction.partial_reforms.1240no verbatim line stored
expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_mortgage_interest_deduction.partial_reforms.265no verbatim line stored
expenditures.conv_scores.muni_bonds_new_issues
corrected
43.1 usd_billionsFY2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
source (primary)
Option 52. Eliminate the Tax Exemption for New Qualified Private Activity Bonds | 43
expenditures.conv_scores.capital_gains_plus_2pts
verified
103 usd_billionsFY2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
source (primary)
Option 47. Raise the Tax Rates on Long-Term Capital Gains and Qualified Dividends by 2 Percentage Points | 103
expenditures.conv_scores.top_rate_increases.cbo.alternatives.01185.3no verbatim line stored
expenditures.conv_scores.top_rate_increases.cbo.alternatives.1569.5no verbatim line stored
expenditures.enforcement.audit_roi
verified
12 revenue per dollar of audit costBoning, Hendren, Sprung-Keyser & Stuart, NBER Working Paper 31376; published Quarterly Journal of Economics 140(1), pp. 63- (primary)
We estimate the returns to IRS audits of taxpayers across the income distribution. We find an additional $1 spent auditing taxpayers above the 90th income percentile yields more than $12 in revenue, while audits of below-median income taxpayers yield $5.
expenditures.enforcement.revenue_per_audit_hour
verified
The Budget Lab at Yale, A Weakened IRS Has Substantial Consequences (secondary)
an extra hour spent auditing a taxpayer earning over $5 million generated roughly $4,900 in recommended additional tax—compared to $650 for audits of taxpayers earning around $200,000.
expenditures.enforcement.cbo_rescission
corrected
2024-2034CBO, How Changes in Funding for the IRS Affect Revenues (primary)
A $20 billion rescission would reduce revenues by $44 billion and increase the cumulative deficit by $24 billion
expenditures.enforcement.yale_total_revenue_loss
corrected
860 usd_billions2026-2035The Budget Lab at Yale (secondary)
Together these reductions total just over $860 billion over the 2026-2035 budget window.
expenditures.enforcement.workforce
verified
by end of 2025The Budget Lab at Yale, citing the National Taxpayer Advocate's annual report to Congress (secondary)
By the end of 2025, the total reduction in staffing amounted to 27,636 employees
expenditures.tax_gap.gross
verified
696 usd_billions
Gross Tax Gap: $696 billion
expenditures.tax_gap.net
verified
606 usd_billions
Net Tax Gap: $606 billion
expenditures.tax_gap.voluntary_compliance_rate
verified
85 percent
Voluntary Compliance Rate: 85.0%
expenditures.tax_gap.net_compliance_rate
verified
86.9 percent
Net Compliance Rate: 86.9%
expenditures.tax_gap.is_current
verified
true
Fall of calendar year 2025—new tax gap estimates and projections (delayed)
expenditures.tax_gap.composition
Nonfiling: $63 billion (9% of gross) / Underreporting: $539 billion (77% of gross) / Underpayment: $94 billion (14% of gross)
expenditures.tax_gap.composition.nonfiling63no verbatim line stored
expenditures.tax_gap.composition.underreporting539no verbatim line stored
expenditures.tax_gap.composition.underpayment94no verbatim line stored
expenditures.tax_gap.composition.individual_income_underreporting381no verbatim line stored
expenditures.tax_gap.visibility_ladder
Items Subject to Substantial Information Reporting and Withholding $9 1% 2% | Items Subject to Substantial Information Reporting $22 3% 6% | Items Subject to Some Information Reporting $71 10% 19% | Items Subject to Little or No Information Reporting $179 26% 47%
expenditures.tax_gap.visibility_ladder.nonfarm_proprietor117
$117 billion in underreporting, comprising 17% of the gross tax gap and 31% of individual income tax underreporting
expenditures.tax_gap.top_1pct_share
unsourced
not shippedno verbatim line stored
expenditures.tax_gap.top_1pct_share.use_this_instead160 usd_billionsannual, TY2019 baseTreasury (Natasha Sarin), The Case for a Robust Attack on the Tax Gap (primary)
more than $160 billion lost annually is from taxes that top 1 percent choose not to pay
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.carried_interest.jct_201515.6 usd_billions~2016-2025
baseline: pre-tcja
Sen. Baldwin's office quoting JCT (secondary)
$15.6 billion in revenue
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.carried_interest.yale_202687.7 usd_billions10 years
baseline: post-obbba
The Budget Lab at Yale, Refining Revenue Estimates: Taxing Carried Interest (primary)
revenue of $87.7 billion over 10 years
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.mega_roth.jct_count
corrected
28000 taxpayersTY2019Senate Finance Committee release of JCT data (primary)
more than 28,000 taxpayers had aggregate IRA account balances of $5 million or more
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.crypto_wash_sales
verified
16.8 usd_billions2021 vintage
baseline: pre-obbba
Tax Policy Center Briefing Book citing JCT (secondary)
the proposed wash-sale restrictions would raise $16.8 billion over a decade
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.crypto_wash_sales.still_opentruesource
crypto and other such digital assets are exempt, hence why many consider it a 'loophole'
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.profit_shifting.global
verified
1000 usd_billions2022EU Tax Observatory, Global Tax Evasion Report 2024 (primary)
$1 trillion in profits booked in tax havens ... 35% of all the profits booked by multinational companies outside of their headquarter country ... The equivalent of nearly 10% of corporate tax revenue collected globally.
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.profit_shifting.us_federal_loss
unsourced
not shippedno verbatim line stored
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.itep_corporate_effective_rates
verified
2018-2022ITEP, Corporate Tax Avoidance in the First Five Years of the Trump Tax Law (primary)
342 companies included in this study paid an average effective income tax rate of just 14.1 percent
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.camt.scored
corrected
222.2 usd_billionsFY2023-FY2031CRS R47328, The 15% Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (reporting JCT's score) (primary)
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that the CAMT will generate additional revenues of $222.2 billion from FY2023 through FY2031.
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.camt.realized
verified_negative
not shippedno verbatim line stored
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.buyback_excise.scored
verified
74 usd_billionsFY2022-FY2031CRS R47397, The 1% Excise Tax on Stock Repurchases (reporting JCT's score) (primary)
$74 billion over the FY2022-FY2031 period
expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.buyback_excise.realized
needs_human_confirmation
8.5 usd_billionsFY2025CBO, Federal Excise Tax Revenues, Figure 2 (primary)
Tobacco tax: $9.5 billion / Tax on corporate stock repurchases: $8.5 billion / Alcohol tax: $8.1 billion / Other excise taxes: $6.5 billion
expenditures.static_expenditures.retirement_savings
verified
355 usd_billionsFY2026CRFB quoting JCX-45-25 (secondary)
Exclusion for Retirement Savings and Pension Contributions | $355 billion
expenditures.static_expenditures.retirement_savings.conv_repeal
not_applicable
not shippedno verbatim line stored
expenditures.static_expenditures.preferential_capital_gains_dividends
verified
252 usd_billionsFY2026(secondary)
Lower Rates for Dividends and Long-Term Capital Gains | $252 billion
expenditures.static_expenditures.employer_health_exclusion_income
verified
240 usd_billionsFY2026(secondary)
Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance | $240 billion
expenditures.static_expenditures.employer_health_exclusion_payroll
unsourced
not shippedJCT, JCX-45-25 (primary)
Thus, for example, the income tax exclusion for employer-paid health insurance is included, but the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA") tax exclusion for employer-paid health insurance is not treated as a tax expenditure in this report.
expenditures.static_expenditures.stepped_up_basis
verified
73 usd_billionsFY2026(secondary)
"Stepped-Up Basis" for Capital Gains at Death | $73 billion
expenditures.static_expenditures.section_199a
verified
76 usd_billionsFY2026(secondary)
Pass-Through Business Income Deduction | $76 billion
expenditures.static_expenditures.charitable_deduction
verified
78 usd_billionsFY2026(secondary)
Charitable Contributions Deduction | $78 billion
expenditures.static_expenditures.salt_deduction
verified
60 usd_billionsFY2026(secondary)
State and Local Tax Deduction | $60 billion
expenditures.static_expenditures.mortgage_interest
verified
261.1 usd_billionsFY2025-2029Novogradac quoting JCX-45-25 (secondary)
$261.1 billion over 2025 to 2029
expenditures.static_expenditures.opportunity_zones
verified
7.8 usd_billionsFY2025-2029Novogradac quoting JCX-45-25 (secondary)
$7.8 billion
expenditures.static_expenditures.municipal_bond_interest
blocked
not shippedno verbatim line stored
expenditures.static_expenditures.like_kind_exchanges_1031
blocked
not shippedno verbatim line stored

Every scenario-card figure

Each figure on a card in Act 3, with the sentence it was read from. The card itself shows the value, the period and the attribution; the quotes are here.

Act 3 scenario cards — the figures and their source lines
DatumValuePeriodSource and the line it was read from
You are here — what current law already does · evidence: strong (official CBO score of enacted law)
Added to the deficit
scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.deficit_effect.value
3400 usd_billions2025-2034
baseline: post-obbba (this IS the OBBBA score)
CBO
CBO estimates that Public Law 119-21 will result in a net increase in the unified budget deficit totaling $3.4 trillion over the 2025-2034 period
Lowest decile, share of resources lost
scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.distribution.verified.bottom_decile_pct
3.9 percentAVERAGE over 2026-2034CBO
Resources for households in the lowest decile of the income distribution would decrease by about $1,600 per year (in 2025 dollars)…That amounts to 3.9 percent of their income
Lowest decile, dollars a year
scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.distribution.verified.bottom_decile_dollars
-1600 usd_2025AVERAGE over 2026-2034CBOno verbatim line stored
Highest decile, share of resources gained
scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.distribution.verified.top_decile_pct
2.3 percentAVERAGE over 2026-2034CBO
Resources would increase, on average, over the projection period by about $12,000 for households in the highest decile, amounting to 2.3 percent of their projected income.
Highest decile, dollars a year
scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.distribution.verified.top_decile_dollars
12000 usd_2025AVERAGE over 2026-2034CBOno verbatim line stored
Close the big loopholes · evidence: moderate
Tax gains at death
expenditures.json → conv_scores.tax_gains_at_death.value
536.1 usd_billionsFY2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
CBO Budget Option 51 (Dec 2024)no verbatim line stored
Tax carried interest as ordinary income
expenditures.json → avoidance_mechanics.carried_interest.yale_2026.value
87.7 usd_billions10 years (2026 vintage)
baseline: post-obbba
Yale Budget Lab (May 2026)no verbatim line stored
Repeal the 199A pass-through deduction
expenditures.json → conv_scores.repeal_199a.value
835.7 usd_billions2027-2036
baseline: post-obbba
Tax Foundation 2026 Options Guideno verbatim line stored
Limit or eliminate itemized deductions — CBO’s range, low end
expenditures.json → conv_scores.eliminate_itemized_deductions.value_range.0
736 usd_billionsFY2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
CBO Budget Option 49 (Dec 2024)no verbatim line stored
Limit or eliminate itemized deductions — CBO’s range, high end
expenditures.json → conv_scores.eliminate_itemized_deductions.value_range.1
3424 usd_billionsFY2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
CBO Budget Option 49 (Dec 2024)
Option 49. Eliminate or Limit Itemized Deductions | 736 to 3,424
Revenue lost to the IRS cuts already made
expenditures.json → enforcement.yale_total_revenue_loss.value
860 usd_billions2026-2035
baseline: post-obbba
Yale Budget Lab (Apr 2026)no verbatim line stored
Tax the ultra-wealthy: a 70% rate above $10 million · evidence: contested
Tax Foundation, ordinary income only, conventional
scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.0.value
291.7 usd_billions2019-2028
baseline: pre-obbba
Tax Foundationno verbatim line stored
Tax Foundation, ordinary income only, dynamic
scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.1.value
189.1 usd_billions2019-2028
baseline: pre-obbba
Tax Foundationno verbatim line stored
Tax Foundation, INCLUDING capital gains, conventional
scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.2.value
51.4 usd_billions2019-2028
baseline: pre-obbba
Tax Foundationno verbatim line stored
Tax Foundation, INCLUDING capital gains, dynamic
scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.3.value
-63.5 usd_billions2019-2028
baseline: pre-obbba
Tax Foundationno verbatim line stored
Penn Wharton, static
scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.4.value
382.3 usd_billions2020-2029
baseline: pre-obbba
Penn Wharton Budget Modelno verbatim line stored
Penn Wharton, business income shifting, full deferral
scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.7.value
163.8 usd_billions2020-2029
baseline: pre-obbba
Penn Wharton Budget Modelno verbatim line stored
Tax wealth, not just income · evidence: contested
Saez & Zucman, 2% above $50M plus 1% above $1B
scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.0.value
2750 usd_billions2019-2028Saez & Zucman (Jan 2019)
the tax would raise around $2.75 trillion over the ten-year budget window 2019-2028 ... about 75,000 American households (less than 0.1%)
Penn Wharton, conventional, matched 2023-2032 window
scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.1.conventional_2023_2032
2700 usd_billions2023-2032Penn Wharton Budget Model (Mar 2021)no verbatim line stored
Penn Wharton, conventional, standard 2022-2031 window
scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.1.conventional_2022_2031
2100 usd_billions2022-2031Penn Wharton Budget Model (Mar 2021)
2.1 trillion over the standard 10-year budget window (2022-2031)
Summers & Sarin, annual, low end
scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.2.annual_range.0
25 usd_billions_per_yearper year, no ten-year total publishedSummers & Sarin (Jun 2019)
$25 billion is a rough back-of-the-envelope number
Summers & Sarin, annual, high end
scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.2.annual_range.1
75 usd_billions_per_yearper year, no ten-year total publishedSummers & Sarin (Jun 2019)
We would be surprised if the $25-billion-a-year figure we suggest was not a significant underestimate.
Norway, wealth-tax revenue in 2022
scenarios.json → wealth_tax.international_track_record.norway.revenue.2022
27 billion_kroner2022AFP wire report off Norwegian government figuresno verbatim line stored
Norway, wealth-tax revenue in 2025 (estimated)
scenarios.json → wealth_tax.international_track_record.norway.revenue.2025
34 billion_kroner2025 (estimated)AFP wire report off Norwegian government figuresno verbatim line stored
Norway, multimillionaires and billionaires who left for Switzerland
scenarios.json → wealth_tax.international_track_record.norway.emigration.value
300 countby 2024AFP wire reportno verbatim line stored
Switzerland, wealth-tax revenue
scenarios.json → wealth_tax.international_track_record.switzerland.value
1 percent_of_gdpas reported 2019OECD via PolitiFact
Switzerland reaps far more than other nations, taking in revenues equal to 1% of GDP.
Switch to a flat tax · evidence: strong scoring, stale baseline
Ten-year revenue effect of the Cruz plan
scenarios.json → flat_tax.revenue.value
-8600 usd_billions2016-2026
baseline: pre-tcja AND pre-obbba (DOUBLY STALE)
Tax Policy Center (Feb 2016)
It would cut taxes by an average of about $6,100, or about 8.5 percent of after-tax income. On average, households at all income levels would receive tax cuts, but the highest-income households would receive the largest cuts, both in dollars and as a percentage of income.
Lowest quintile, change in after-tax income
scenarios.json → flat_tax.distribution.table.0.pct_change_after_tax_income
0.4 percentcalendar year 2017 (a single-year snapshot, NOT the 10-year window)Tax Policy Centerno verbatim line stored
Middle quintile, change in after-tax income
scenarios.json → flat_tax.distribution.table.2.pct_change_after_tax_income
3.2 percentcalendar year 2017 (a single-year snapshot, NOT the 10-year window)Tax Policy Centerno verbatim line stored
Top 1 percent, change in after-tax income
scenarios.json → flat_tax.distribution.table.5.pct_change_after_tax_income
26 percentcalendar year 2017 (a single-year snapshot, NOT the 10-year window)Tax Policy Centerno verbatim line stored
Top 0.1 percent, change in after-tax income
scenarios.json → flat_tax.distribution.table.6.pct_change_after_tax_income
29 percentcalendar year 2017 (a single-year snapshot, NOT the 10-year window)Tax Policy Centerno verbatim line stored
Replace the income tax with a national sales tax (FairTax, H.R. 25) · evidence: moderate (rate analyses are robust; distributional detail is thin and dated)
Legislated rate, tax-inclusive framing
scenarios.json → fairtax.rate_framing.tax_inclusive
23 percentH.R. 25 as introducedthe bill textno verbatim line stored
The same rate, tax-exclusive framing
scenarios.json → fairtax.rate_framing.tax_exclusive
30 percentH.R. 25 as introducedthe bill textno verbatim line stored
Revenue-neutral rate, tax-inclusive
scenarios.json → fairtax.revenue_neutral_rate.gale_pomerleau.1.inclusive
34.1 percentas scoredGale / Pomerleauno verbatim line stored
Revenue-neutral rate, tax-exclusive
scenarios.json → fairtax.revenue_neutral_rate.gale_pomerleau.1.exclusive
51.7 percentas scoredGale / Pomerleauno verbatim line stored
Share of the federal tax burden borne by the bottom 80%, today
scenarios.json → fairtax.distribution.table.0.share_of_federal_income_taxes_current
15.8 percentas scoredas recorded in scenarios.jsonno verbatim line stored
Share of the federal tax burden borne by the bottom 80% under the FairTax
scenarios.json → fairtax.distribution.table.0.share_of_federal_sales_taxes_nrst
34.9 percentas scoredas recorded in scenarios.jsonno verbatim line stored
Fund the IRS · evidence: strong on direction, contested on magnitude
Return per dollar spent auditing above the 90th percentile
expenditures.json → enforcement.audit_roi.value
12 ratioTY2010-2014 audits, published 2023Boning, Hendren, Sprung-Keyser & Stuartno verbatim line stored
Revenue lost to the IRS cuts already made
expenditures.json → enforcement.yale_total_revenue_loss.value
860 usd_billions2026-2035
baseline: post-obbba
Yale Budget Lab (Apr 2026)no verbatim line stored
Revenue lost to a $20 billion rescission
expenditures.json → enforcement.cbo_rescission.revenue_loss
44 usd_billions2024-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
CBO (Feb 2024)no verbatim line stored
Gross tax gap
expenditures.json → tax_gap.gross.value
696 usd_billionsTY2022IRS Publication 5869 (Oct 2024)
Gross Tax Gap: $696 billion
Scrap the Social Security payroll cap · evidence: strong (mechanical)
CBO: apply the tax to earnings above $250,000
scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.cbo_options.alternatives.1.value
1426.8 usd_billions2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
CBO Budget Option 60955 (Dec 2024)no verbatim line stored
CBO: raise the taxable share of earnings to 90 percent
scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.cbo_options.alternatives.0.value
727.6 usd_billions2025-2034
baseline: pre-obbba
CBO Budget Option 60955 (Dec 2024)no verbatim line stored
SSA E2.1 — no benefit credit: share of the 75-year shortfall closed
scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.ssa_solvency.provisions.0.pct_of_deficit_closed
67 percent2025 Trustees Report basis, 75-year long-range periodSSA Office of the Chief Actuaryno verbatim line stored
SSA E2.2 — with benefit credit: share of the 75-year shortfall closed
scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.ssa_solvency.provisions.1.pct_of_deficit_closed
48 percent2025 Trustees Report basis, 75-year long-range periodSSA Office of the Chief Actuaryno verbatim line stored
The 2026 taxable maximum
scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.current_cap.2026
184500 usd2026SSA Office of the Chief Actuary
2026 | $184,500
Bring back the 2021 Child Tax Credit · evidence: strong on the poverty effect, contested on employment
What JCT scored the one-year expansion at
scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.cost.value
109.5 usd_billionsFY2021-2031 (a one-year policy; essentially all of the cost lands in FY2021-2022)
baseline: pre-obbba
JCT, via the American Action Forum
the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that these expansions and modifications to the CTC will cost $109.5 billion over the next decade.
Child poverty (SPM) in 2020, before the expansion
scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.0.value
9.7 percent2020U.S. Census Bureau
Child poverty, calculated by the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), fell to its lowest recorded level in 2021, declining 46% from 9.7% in 2020 to 5.2% in 2021
Child poverty (SPM) in 2021, with the expansion
scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.1.value
5.2 percent2021U.S. Census Bureau
the national child SPM rate was its lowest ever at 5.2%
Child poverty (SPM) in 2022, after it lapsed
scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.2.value
12.4 percent2022U.S. Census Bureau
The rate increased to 12.4% in 2022
Child poverty (SPM) in 2023
scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.3.value
13.7 percent2023U.S. Census Bureau
and 13.7% in 2023
Child poverty (SPM) in 2024
scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.4.value
13.4 percent2024ITEP (secondary)
13.4 percent of children living in poverty
The credit today
scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.current_law.amount.value
2200 usdTY2026IRS Revenue Procedure 2025-32
the maximum amount of the credit allowed under § 24(a) is $2,200
How much of it a family with no tax liability can actually receive
scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.current_law.refundable.value
1700 usdTY2026IRS Revenue Procedure 2025-32
the amount used in § 24(d)(1)(A) to determine the amount of the credit under § 24 that may be refundable is $1,700
Corinth, Meyer, Stadnicki & Wu: predicted fall in employment
scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.employment_dispute.predicted.value
1.5 millions_of_workersa permanent child allowanceCorinth, Meyer, Stadnicki & Wu (simulation)
By eliminating the strong work incentives in the previous CTC, we estimate that the proposal would reduce employment by approximately 1.5 million workers, which would diminish the proposal's effect on child poverty and eliminate its effect on deep child poverty altogether.
Housing vouchers for everyone who qualifies · evidence: strong
Extra annual cost of serving everyone eligible
scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.cost.value
118 usd_billions2022 (simulated)Urban Institute (Aug 2023)
We estimate that providing subsidies to all who are eligible would increase the total amount of subsidies paid by $118 billion, to a total of $168 billion.
People moved above the poverty line
scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.poverty_effect.people_lifted.value
6.4 millions_of_people2022 (simulated)Urban Institute (Aug 2023)
The reduction in the rate from 14.7 percent to 12.8 percent amounts to 6.4 million people moving from below poverty to above poverty because of the increased resources from housing subsidies.
Poverty rate now
scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.poverty_effect.spm_rate_before.value
14.7 percent2022 (simulated)Urban Institute (Aug 2023)
We estimate that at current levels of housing assistance, 14.7 percent of the population is below the SPM poverty level
Poverty rate with vouchers for all who qualify
scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.poverty_effect.spm_rate_after.value
12.8 percent2022 (simulated)Urban Institute (Aug 2023)
the poverty rate would fall to 12.8 percent with full funding and use of housing vouchers
Share of eligible households served today
scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.coverage_gap.share_served.value
25 percent2022 (simulated)Urban Institute (Aug 2023)
We estimate that about 25 percent of households eligible for housing assistance currently receive it.
Households assisted today
scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.coverage_gap.households.current
4.4 millions_of_households2022 (simulated)Urban Institute (Aug 2023)
About 4.4 million households currently receive housing assistance and we estimate that this would increase by 13.2 million to a total of 17.6 million with full funding and use of housing vouchers.
Households assisted if everyone eligible were served
scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.coverage_gap.households.total
17.6 millions_of_households2022 (simulated)Urban Institute (Aug 2023)
About 4.4 million households currently receive housing assistance and we estimate that this would increase by 13.2 million to a total of 17.6 million with full funding and use of housing vouchers.
Families offered a long-term subsidy who used a shelter, months 21-32
scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.causal_evidence.rates.long_term_rent_subsidy
4.4 percent37 months after random assignmentGubits et al., JPAM 2018 (randomised trial)
The offer of a long-term rent subsidy reduced use of emergency shelters in months 21 to 32 after random assignment by more than three-quarters
Families offered usual care who used a shelter, months 21-32
scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.causal_evidence.rates.usual_care
18.8 percent37 months after random assignmentGubits et al., JPAM 2018 (randomised trial)
The offer of a long-term rent subsidy reduced use of emergency shelters in months 21 to 32 after random assignment by more than three-quarters
A carbon tax with a per-person dividend · evidence: strong on incidence, weak on political durability
Opening rate
scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.structure.opening_rate
49 usd_per_metric_ton_co2e2019 in Treasury’s modelled scheduleU.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115
a carbon tax that started at $49 per metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (mt CO2-e) in 2019 and increased to $70 in 2028
Rate by 2028
scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.structure.rate_2028
70 usd_per_metric_ton_co2e2028 in Treasury’s modelled scheduleU.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115
a carbon tax that started at $49 per metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (mt CO2-e) in 2019 and increased to $70 in 2028
Gross revenue
scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.gross_revenue.value
2962 usd_billions2019-2028
baseline: pre-obbba
U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115
$2,962 billion
Poorest decile, change in after-tax income WITH the rebate
scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.incidence.with_rebate.poorest_decile
9 percentas modelled, WP-115U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115
The TDM estimates that the poorest decile would experience almost a 9 percent increase in average after-tax income compared to a 1 percent decrease in average after-tax income for the top income decile.
Top decile, change in after-tax income WITH the rebate
scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.incidence.with_rebate.top_decile
-1 percentas modelled, WP-115U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115
The TDM estimates that the poorest decile would experience almost a 9 percent increase in average after-tax income compared to a 1 percent decrease in average after-tax income for the top income decile.
Lowest decile, change in after-tax income from the tax ALONE
scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.incidence.tax_alone_no_rebate.lowest_decile
-0.8 percentas modelled, WP-115U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115
The lowest income decile is estimated to have a 0.8 percent decrease in after-tax income because of the carbon tax and the magnitude of this percentage change in after-tax income rises with income through the 9th decile.
The 1986 model: broaden the base, lower the rates · evidence: strong on what happened, contested as a template
Top individual rate before
scenarios.json → tra86_model.rates.individual_top.from
50 percent1986CRFB
reducing the top individual rate from 50 to 28 percent
Top individual rate after
scenarios.json → tra86_model.rates.individual_top.to
28 percent1988CRFB
reducing the top individual rate from 50 to 28 percent
Top corporate rate before
scenarios.json → tra86_model.rates.corporate_top.from
46 percent1979-1986CRFB
the top corporate rate from 46 to 34 percent
Top corporate rate after
scenarios.json → tra86_model.rates.corporate_top.to
34 percent1988-1992CRFB
the top corporate rate from 46 to 34 percent
Size of the swap: individuals cut, corporations raised
scenarios.json → tra86_model.revenue_neutrality.value
120 usd_billionsfive years from enactmentCRFB
Overall, the Act was revenue-neutral, with the individual tax system receiving a $120 billion tax cut over five years and the corporate side getting a $120 billion tax increase

The Act 1 honesty notes, and what backs them

Two of the nine causal-honesty notes attached to the history charts shipped in an earlier build carrying a visible “pending re-verification” flag, and the California Proposition 30 counter-experiment was named beside the Kansas one without figures. All three were closed on 18 August 2026 and their sources are below.

Act 1 causal-honesty notes — act1-notes.json
DatumValuePeriodSource and the line it was read from
act1-notes.note_8_rates_and_top_shares.citations.018 OECD countries, post-1960 changes in top marginal ratesThomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 'Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities', American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6(1), 230-271 (primary)
Top tax rate cuts are associated with top one percent pretax income shares increases but not higher economic growth.
act1-notes.note_8_rates_and_top_shares.citations.118 OECD countries, 1965-2015David Hope & Julian Limberg, 'The economic consequences of major tax cuts for the rich', Socio-Economic Review 20(2), 539-559 (primary)
We find tax cuts for the rich lead to higher income inequality in both the short- and medium-term. In contrast, such reforms do not have any significant effect on economic growth or unemployment.
act1-notes.note_8_rates_and_top_shares.citations.2United States, 1945-2010Thomas L. Hungerford, Congressional Research Service report R42729, 'Taxes and the Economy: An Economic Analysis of the Top Tax Rates Since 1945' (primary)
changes over the past 65 years in the top marginal tax rate and the top capital gains tax rate do not appear correlated with economic growth
act1-notes.note_8_rates_and_top_shares.critique
verified
Tax Foundation, 'Retracted CRS Report on Taxes and Growth Flawed, But Still Cited' (Stephen J. Entin) (primary)
looking only at the first year effect throws out about 95 percent of the outcome
act1-notes.note_9_1950s_caveats.figures_it_displays.1
verified
28.3 percentno verbatim line stored
act1-notes.prop_30_counter_experiment.estimates.0California, 2013-2014'Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California', American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 16(1), 34-86 (primary)
An additional 0.8 percent of the residential tax base that landed in the top bracket left California in 2013.
act1-notes.prop_30_counter_experiment.estimates.1California, 2013-2014'Millionaire Migration in California: Administrative Data for Three Waves of Tax Reform', Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality with the California Franchise Tax Board (primary)
For each 1 point increase in the tax rate, we find that the net migration rate decreases 0.8 per thousand population

What could not be retrieved

17 claims from the project’s own research notes could not be traced to a source and are therefore not displayed anywhere in the tool. 2 of the 9 items that once blocked a deliverable are still open; 7 were closed when the source spreadsheets were obtained.

Still open

Claims that must not ship, and why

The data files themselves

Every figure in the tool resolves to one of these. They are plain JSON and each datum carries its own value, unit, period, status, source, URL and verbatim quote.

The data directory
FileSizeWhat is in it
baseline-fy2025.json16.2 KBCurrent-law fiscal baseline: receipts by source, outlays, deficit, GDP.
history-series.json64.0 KBAct 1 chart series: statutory and effective rates 1913–2026, distribution, mobility, cost of living.
series-arrays.json145.7 KBThe long-run year-by-year arrays behind the history charts.
parameters.json42.5 KBBehavioural dials: elasticities, multipliers, spending propensities, incidence, macro feedback.
expenditures.json46.2 KBTax expenditures, repeal scores, distributional shares, avoidance mechanics, the tax gap, enforcement.
scenarios.json68.5 KBAct 3 scenario cards: every score, and both sides of every dispute.
cbo-distribution.json191.8 KBCBO’s household income and tax distribution, 1979–2022.
soi-table-3-5.json16.3 KBIRS Statistics of Income Table 3.5 for tax year 2023 — the static base for every computed rate change.
soi-percentiles.json26.0 KBIRS percentile thresholds and average rates.
act1-notes.json9.7 KBSources for the Act 1 causal-honesty notes, and both sides of the California Proposition 30 counter-experiment.
blocked.json24.9 KBWhat could not be retrieved, and exactly what would close each item.

Freshness

Figures are as of the fiscal years and windows shown. This page is reviewed when major tax legislation passes, not on a schedule. It carries no provider listings and is outside the weekly resource-verification cycle.