The Tax Ladder: methodology and sources
Every number the tool displays resolves to a file in learn/tax-explorer/data/, and every one of those files stores the verbatim line from the source it came from. The tool strips those quotes to keep its own weight down. This page is where they live.
The ten-year convention
Two kinds of number appear in the sandbox, and they are produced in different ways.
Pre-scored reforms — closing a loophole, adding a value-added tax, restoring enforcement funding — take the published conventional score directly, over whatever budget window its scorekeeper used. Those windows differ between sources and are printed beside every figure. A conventional score already contains the taxpayer response; the tool does not apply a second behavioural adjustment on top of one.
Rate changes are computed here, from IRS Statistics of Income Table 3.5 for tax year 2023, and multiplied by ten. They are not uprated for income growth across the window, which real scorekeepers do. Every self-computed ten-year figure in this tool is therefore smaller than a properly uprated score of the same policy would be. Where a lever's own figure lands below a published estimate of the same idea, that is one of the reasons; when that happens, the panel says so.
Four calculations that are ours
Most of what the engine does is arithmetic on somebody else's published number. Four steps are not. Each is a judgement, each has a direction of bias, and each is labelled in the interface where it does its work.
1. The AGI-class to CBO-group crosswalk
Revenue is computed on tax returns. Distribution is reported for households. The two are not the same population and they are not sorted the same way. IRS Statistics of Income ranks returns by adjusted gross income; the Congressional Budget Office ranks households by income before transfers and taxes, adjusted for household size. A married couple filing jointly is one return and one household; two adults sharing a flat are two returns and two households; and a household of four sits lower in CBO's ranking than a single filer on the same income, while the IRS ranks the two identically.
The engine maps each SOI income class onto CBO's published 2022 group boundaries by overlap, treating income as uniformly spread inside each class, and folds the result onto CBO's six groups. Direction of bias: uniform spreading understates concentration inside the top class, so effects driven by the very highest incomes are, if anything, allocated slightly downward. The distributional chart is a statement about direction and relative magnitude between groups. It is not a year-matched ledger, and the third decimal place of any bar is not meaningful.
2. The corporate capital-income allocation
The corporate incidence dial asks how much of a corporate tax change lands on workers and how much on owners of capital. Moving that dial requires knowing how capital income is distributed across the six groups — and CBO publishes average federal tax rates by source, not a capital-income share by group.
The engine backs the share out of two CBO tables by solving for the capital share implied by the published corporate rate under CBO's own stated incidence assumption, which allocates 25 percent of the corporate tax to labour and 75 percent to capital. In other words: given what CBO says the corporate tax rate is for each group, and given CBO's own split, what capital-income distribution must lie underneath? That solved distribution is what lets the dial move at all. Direction of bias: the derivation is anchored to CBO's assumption, so a user who moves the dial toward the "labour bears most of it" end is applying a different incidence assumption to a distribution that was inferred under CBO's. The further from 25 percent the dial travels, the more approximate the result.
3. Corporate revenue scaled linearly
A change in the corporate rate is scaled linearly from actual FY2025 corporate receipts: half the rate, roughly half the receipts. Direction of bias: real corporate tax bases are not linear in the rate — profit-shifting, loss carryforwards, and entity-choice responses all bend the relationship, and the bend is steeper at higher rates. Large corporate-rate movements are the least reliable figure the sandbox produces, and the further from 21 percent the slider travels, the less the number should be trusted.
4. The revenue-feedback-to-GDP conversion
Published growth-feedback estimates are expressed as a share of a policy's static cost recovered through economic growth. The tool needs an effect on GDP. It converts one to the other using the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget's published ratio — that a policy would need to generate five to six dollars of economic activity for every dollar of cost to be self-financing — and reports the result as a band, never a point.
Direction of bias: this is a linear reading of a published rule of thumb, applied outside the specific case CRFB derived it for. It is the coarsest step in the model, which is why the GDP output is a shaded range with both endpoints labelled by the lens that produced them, and why it is never fed back into the revenue figure. That last decision is structural: it is what makes it impossible for any combination of settings in the sandbox to show a tax cut financing itself.
How the engine is validated
The engine is benchmarked against published conventional scores of comparable reforms from CBO, the Tax Foundation and the Penn Wharton Budget Model. Where the engine's own figure can be compared with one of those, both numbers are shown with the reason they differ. A published-score comparison is a weaker check than a microsimulation cross-run, and it is described that way rather than as a match.
The build plan also called for a cross-run against PolicyEngine, an open-source microsimulation model. That cross-run has not been completed, and no PolicyEngine result appears anywhere in the tool.
One case is specifically excluded even from the substitute check. No cross-check of any kind is claimed for the capital-gains lever, because PolicyEngine does not model realization responses — the thing that dominates the answer for capital gains. The project's data file records the developers' own statement that capital-gains behavioural responses were still being added. A validator that does not model the mechanism cannot validate a lever built on it.
The baseline problem
Public Law 119-21, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, was enacted in July 2025. It made the 2017 individual rate schedule permanent, set the estate exemption at $15 million, and changed the state and local tax deduction.
Almost every published revenue score still in circulation predates it. The Congressional Budget Office's options volume is dated December 2024 and assumed the individual provisions would expire at the end of 2025. They did not. Those scores are stale in direction, not merely in size: measured against a permanent-rates baseline, most revenue-raisers would score higher than their published figure, because there is more revenue left to raise.
This is why a pre-OBBBA label on a score is a correctness question rather than a footnote. A score is a difference between two worlds, and if the world it was differenced against no longer exists, the number means something other than what it appears to mean. Every score datum in this project carries a baseline field, and the interface prints it beside the figure.
Three sources in the entire dataset are post-OBBBA: the Tax Foundation's 2026 Options Guide, the Yale Budget Lab's May 2026 re-estimate of carried interest, and Congressional Research Service report IF13190 of March 2026 on the mortgage interest deduction. Everything else is pre-OBBBA and labelled.
What this tool will not say
The list below is enforced two ways: by a unit test over every string the engine generates, and by a scan of the rendered page and every scenario card.
- No tax cut finances itself. Growth effects are computed and displayed, and are never added back into the revenue figure. Verified growth feedback in this dataset runs from about −5 percent to +32 percent of a change's static cost. The arithmetic of getting to 100 percent is set out in the sandbox's own honesty notes.
- No point estimate of GDP. The macro output is always a two-ended band, and the endpoints are labelled with the modelling lens that produced them.
- No year-by-year macro path. The tool reports a tenth-year effect and a ten-year total. It does not draw a trajectory between them.
- No sub-quintile precision. Distribution is reported for quintiles plus the top 1 percent. Finer breakouts exist in the source data for some series and are not used in the chart.
- No certainty about tax incidence. Who ultimately bears the corporate tax is disputed; the tool ships a dial with the range of published positions and names the shop at each end.
- No optimal-rate claim. The sandbox will show where revenue from a band stops rising. Revenue-maximising is not a recommendation, and the tool does not make one.
- No averaging of contested estimates. Where shops disagree, both numbers ship with attribution.
- No number without a period. Every dollar figure carries its fiscal year or budget window.
Every behavioural parameter
These are the dials in the sandbox and the constants behind them. Where a parameter is contested, both positions are in the table and the tool ships them as a range rather than an average.
| Datum | Value | Period | Source and the line it was read from |
|---|---|---|---|
| eti verified | — | Saez, Slemrod & Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, Journal of Economic Literature 50(1), March 2012, pp. 3-50 (secondary)However, in a 2012 review of the literature, leading scholars argued 'the best available estimates range from 0.12 to 0.40.' | |
| eti.what_it_measures | — | —the elasticity captures not only the hours of work response, but also all other behavioral responses to marginal tax rates | |
| eti.top_earners | 0.57 | — | Diamond & Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax, JEP 25(4), 2011the optimal top tax rate using the current taxable income base ... would be τ*=1/(1+1.5 x 0.57)=54 percent while the optimal top tax rate using a broader income base ... would be τ*=1/(1+1.5 x 0.17)=80 percent. |
| eti.jct_own_assumption blocked | not shipped | — | —This approach is based on empirical research suggesting that taxable income elasticities are lower for lower-income taxpayers than for higher-income taxpayers. |
| revenue_maximizing_top_rate.credible_critique | 49 percent | — | Badel, Huggett & Luo, Taxing Top Earners: A Human Capital Perspective, The Economic Journal 130(629), 2020, pp. 1200-1225 (primary)An established view is that the revenue maximizing top tax rate for the US is approximately 73 percent. In contrast, the revenue maximizing top tax rate is approximately 49 percent in our quantitative human capital model. |
| capital_gains_realization_elasticity.persistent verified | -0.72 | — | Dowd, McClelland & Muthitacharoen, New Evidence on the Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains, National Tax Journal 68(3), 2015, pp. 511-544 (secondary)The preferred persistent elasticity estimate is –0.72 and is statistically significant and robust to a number of sensitivity tests. |
| capital_gains_realization_elasticity.transitory verified | -1.2 | — | Dowd, McClelland & Muthitacharoen, New Evidence on the Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains, CBO Working Paper 2012-09 (primary)-1.20 with a standard error of 0.35 |
| capital_gains_realization_elasticity.scorekeeper_rev_max_rate verified | 30 percent | — | Sarin, Summers, Zidar & Zwick, Rethinking How We Score Capital Gains Tax Reform, BFI Working Paper 2021-10 / Tax Policy and the Economy 36, 2022The prevailing wisdom among some in the scorekeeping community (e.g., Tax Policy Center, Tax Foundation, Penn Wharton Budget Model) has been that the revenue-maximizing capital gains rate is around 30 percent |
| capital_gains_realization_elasticity.agersnap_zidar_alternative verified | — | Agersnap & Zidar, The Tax Elasticity of Capital Gains and Revenue-Maximizing Rates, NBER Working Paper 27705, 2020 (abstract)We find that the elasticity of revenues with respect to the tax rate over a ten-year period is -0.5 to -0.3, indicating that capital gains tax cuts do not pay for themselves, and that a 5 percentage point rate increase would yield $18 to $30 billion in annual federal tax revenue. Our long-run estimates yield revenue-maximizing capital gains tax rates of 38 to 47 percent. | |
| fiscal_multipliers.state_dependence.supports | — | Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy, AEJ: Economic Policy 4(2), May 2012, pp. 1-27 (abstract)A key issue in current research and policy is the size of fiscal multipliers when the economy is in recession. We provide three insights. First, using regime-switching models, we find large differences in the size of spending multipliers in recessions and expansions with fiscal policy being considerably more effective in recessions than in expansions. | |
| fiscal_multipliers.state_dependence.rejects | — | Ramey & Zubairy, Government Spending Multipliers in Good Times and in Bad: Evidence from US Historical Data, Journal of Political Economy 126(2), 2018, pp. 850-901 (primary)We investigate whether US government spending multipliers are higher during periods of economic slack or when interest rates are near the zero lower bound. Using new quarterly historical US data covering multiple large wars and deep recessions, we estimate multipliers that are below unity irrespective of the amount of slack in the economy. These results are robust to two leading identification schemes, two different estimation methodologies, and many alternative specifications. In contrast, the results are more mixed for the zero lower bound state, with a few specifications implying multipliers as high as 1.5. | |
| mpc.johnson_parker_souleles verified | — | Johnson, Parker & Souleles, Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 2001, AER 96(5), December 2006, pp. 1589-1610 (abstract)spent 20 to 40 percent of their rebates on nondurable goods during the three-month period ... roughly two-thirds of their rebates ... responses are larger for households with low liquid wealth or low income | |
| mpc.heterogeneity corrected | — | Jappelli & Pistaferri, Fiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity, AEJ: Macroeconomics 6(4), 2014, pp. 107-136 (primary)The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is 48 percent on average. We also find substantial heterogeneity in the distribution, as households with low cash-on-hand exhibit a much higher MPC than affluent households | |
| labor_supply_elasticity.cbo_report | — | CBO, How the Supply of Labor Responds to Changes in Fiscal Policy (primary)the overall substitution elasticity ranges from 0.17 to 0.37, with a central estimate of 0.27 | |
| labor_supply_elasticity.cbo_working_paper | — | McClelland & Mok, A Review of Recent Research on Labor Supply Elasticities, CBO Working Paper 2012-12 (primary)substitution elasticities for the total population that range from 0.1 to 0.3 | |
| labor_supply_elasticity.margins partial | — | —hours elasticity ... ranges from -0.1 to 0.2 … Estimates of the participation elasticity for lower-income taxpayers eligible for the EITC range from 0.3 to 1.2 … the total substitution elasticity (including both hours and participation effects) appears to range from 0.1 to 0.3 for men and single women and from 0.2 to 0.4 for married women … substitution elasticities tend to be smaller for primary earners with higher earnings because, for them, the effects on participation are smaller … For the bottom 10 percent of earners, the participation component of the elasticity is 0.22, giving them a total substitution elasticity of 0.47 | |
| corporate_incidence.shops.0 | — | JCT, Modeling the Distribution of Taxes on Business Income (JCX-14-13) (primary)25 percent of corporate income taxes are borne by domestic labor and 75 percent are borne by owners of domestic capital | |
| corporate_incidence.shops.1 | — | CBO, The Distribution of Household Income in 2021, Appendix A (Incidence of Federal Taxes) (primary)CBO's approach is to allocate 75 percent of corporate income taxes to owners of capital in proportion to their income from interest, dividends, rents, and adjusted capital gains... CBO allocates the remaining 25 percent of corporate income taxes to workers in proportion to their income from labor. | |
| corporate_incidence.shops.2 | — | Cronin, Lin, Power & Cooper, Distributing the Corporate Income Tax: Revised U.S. Treasury Methodology, OTA Technical Paper 5 (primary)82% of the corporate income tax burden is distributed to capital income and 18% is distributed to labor income. | |
| corporate_incidence.shops.3 | — | TPC Briefing Book, Who bears the burden of the corporate income tax? (secondary)investment returns (dividends, interest, capital gains, etc.) bear 80 percent of the burden, with wages and other labor income carrying the remaining 20 percent. | |
| corporate_incidence.shops.4 | — | Stephen J. Entin, Labor Bears Much of the Cost of the Corporate Tax, Tax Foundation (primary)These studies appear to show that labor bears between 50 percent and 100 percent of the burden of the corporate income tax, with 70 percent or higher the most likely outcome. | |
| growth_feedback.anchors.0 | 1 to 22 | — | CBO, Analyzing the Economic and Budgetary Effects of a 10 Percent Cut in Income Tax Rates (primary)the budgetary impact of the economic changes was estimated to offset between 1 percent and 22 percent of the revenue loss from the tax cut over the first five years and add as much as 5 percent to that loss or offset as much as 32 percent of it over the second five years. |
| growth_feedback.anchors.2 | 15 | — | —According to models that account for both supply-side and demand-side effects, those effects might offset somewhat less than 15 percent of the revenue loss over the first five years. |
| growth_feedback.anchors.3 | — | JCT, Macroeconomic Analysis of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1 (JCX-69-17) (primary)the overall budgetary effects of changes in economic growth are projected to reduce the deficit by $385 billion during the budget window. | |
| growth_feedback.anchors.4 | 25 | — | William G. Gale, Brookings, Did the 2017 tax cut pay for itself? (primary)On average, these models estimated that economic growth effects (the 'dynamic effects') will only offset about a quarter of the 10-year revenue loss associated with the TCJA. ... Excluding the Tax Foundation, which is an outlier in these estimates, drops the average offset to less than 20%. |
| growth_feedback.anchors.5 | 1 to 14 | — | CRFB, Tax Cut Extension Only Pays for 1-14% of Itself (primary)TCJA extension would create dynamic feedback sufficient to offset between 1 percent and 14 percent of its static cost over a decade. |
| growth_feedback.intuition_pump | — | CRFBtax cuts rarely if ever fully pay for themselves. Because taxes capture only a fraction of income and some spending grows with income, a policy would need to produce $5 to $6 of economic activity for every $1 of cost to be self-financing. | |
| growth_feedback.tcja_verdict | — | CRFB, Has TCJA Paid For Itself?it is almost certainly true that the TCJA meaningfully reduced revenue from where it would have been absent the TCJA. | |
| tcja_four_scores.shops.1 corrected | 2018-2028 (ELEVEN years) | CBO, How the 2017 Tax Act Affects CBO's Projections (primary)CBO estimated that the tax act would increase the primary deficit by $1.8 trillion … the feedback is estimated to lower the cumulative primary deficit by about $550 billion … raised projected debt-service costs by roughly $600 billion … The act therefore increases the total projected deficit over the 2018–2028 period by about $1.9 trillion. | |
| tcja_four_scores.shops.2 corrected | 2018-2027 | Penn Wharton Budget Model (primary)2018-2027 -$2,209 -$1,786 -$2,038 $2,387 $1,941 $2,238 | |
| tcja_four_scores.shops.3 verified | 2018-2027 | Tax Foundation (primary)the plan would decrease federal revenues by $1.47 trillion on a static basis and by $448 billion on a dynamic basis | |
| policyengine_validation.critical_finding_about_policyengine | — | Max Ghenis, Behavioral Responses in PolicyEngine USwe are now working on adding capital gains responses |
Every pre-scored reform
Where a policy has been scored by a scorekeeper, the tool uses the published figure rather than recomputing it, and prints the window and the baseline beside it. Read the baseline label before the number.
| Datum | Value | Period | Source and the line it was read from |
|---|---|---|---|
| expenditures.conv_scores.tax_gains_at_death corrected | 536.1 usd_billions | FY2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | source (primary)Include accrued capital gains in the last income tax return of decedents — 10-year total (2025–2034): -$536.1 billion |
| expenditures.conv_scores.carryover_basis_only corrected | 196.9 usd_billions | FY2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | source (primary)Option 51. Change the Taxation of Assets Transferred at Death | 197 to 536 |
| expenditures.conv_scores.employer_health_exclusion_cap corrected | FY2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | source (primary)Option 56. Reduce Tax Subsidies for Employment-Based Health Benefits | 521 to 965 | |
| expenditures.conv_scores.employer_health_exclusion_cap.alternatives.0 | 521 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.conv_scores.employer_health_exclusion_cap.alternatives.1 | 965 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.conv_scores.employer_health_exclusion_cap.alternatives.2 | 697 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_199a corrected | 835.7 usd_billions | 2027-2036 baseline: post-obbba | Tax Foundation 2026 Options Guide, Eliminate the Section 199A Pass-Through Deduction (primary)Conventional primary deficit change (10-Yr): -$835.7B; Dynamic primary deficit change (10-Yr): -$505.9B |
| expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_199a.alternative_partial | FY2026-2035 | Penn Wharton Budget Model, Eliminating Excess Benefits from Section 199Aoptions to remove the excess benefit while maintaining the 20 percent tax benefit could raise between $46B and $178B over the 10-year budget window | |
| expenditures.conv_scores.eliminate_itemized_deductions corrected | FY2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | source (primary)Option 49. Eliminate or Limit Itemized Deductions | 736 to 3,424 | |
| expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_mortgage_interest_deduction corrected | 495 usd_billions | FY2026-2035 baseline: post-obbba | CRS In Focus IF13190, Reforms to the Mortgage Interest Deduction with Revenue Estimates (primary)Repeal MID — $495 billion |
| expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_mortgage_interest_deduction.partial_reforms.0 | 368 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_mortgage_interest_deduction.partial_reforms.1 | 240 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.conv_scores.repeal_mortgage_interest_deduction.partial_reforms.2 | 65 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.conv_scores.muni_bonds_new_issues corrected | 43.1 usd_billions | FY2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | source (primary)Option 52. Eliminate the Tax Exemption for New Qualified Private Activity Bonds | 43 |
| expenditures.conv_scores.capital_gains_plus_2pts verified | 103 usd_billions | FY2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | source (primary)Option 47. Raise the Tax Rates on Long-Term Capital Gains and Qualified Dividends by 2 Percentage Points | 103 |
| expenditures.conv_scores.top_rate_increases.cbo.alternatives.0 | 1185.3 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.conv_scores.top_rate_increases.cbo.alternatives.1 | 569.5 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.enforcement.audit_roi verified | 12 revenue per dollar of audit cost | — | Boning, Hendren, Sprung-Keyser & Stuart, NBER Working Paper 31376; published Quarterly Journal of Economics 140(1), pp. 63- (primary)We estimate the returns to IRS audits of taxpayers across the income distribution. We find an additional $1 spent auditing taxpayers above the 90th income percentile yields more than $12 in revenue, while audits of below-median income taxpayers yield $5. |
| expenditures.enforcement.revenue_per_audit_hour verified | — | The Budget Lab at Yale, A Weakened IRS Has Substantial Consequences (secondary)an extra hour spent auditing a taxpayer earning over $5 million generated roughly $4,900 in recommended additional tax—compared to $650 for audits of taxpayers earning around $200,000. | |
| expenditures.enforcement.cbo_rescission corrected | 2024-2034 | CBO, How Changes in Funding for the IRS Affect Revenues (primary)A $20 billion rescission would reduce revenues by $44 billion and increase the cumulative deficit by $24 billion | |
| expenditures.enforcement.yale_total_revenue_loss corrected | 860 usd_billions | 2026-2035 | The Budget Lab at Yale (secondary)Together these reductions total just over $860 billion over the 2026-2035 budget window. |
| expenditures.enforcement.workforce verified | by end of 2025 | The Budget Lab at Yale, citing the National Taxpayer Advocate's annual report to Congress (secondary)By the end of 2025, the total reduction in staffing amounted to 27,636 employees | |
| expenditures.tax_gap.gross verified | 696 usd_billions | — | —Gross Tax Gap: $696 billion |
| expenditures.tax_gap.net verified | 606 usd_billions | — | —Net Tax Gap: $606 billion |
| expenditures.tax_gap.voluntary_compliance_rate verified | 85 percent | — | —Voluntary Compliance Rate: 85.0% |
| expenditures.tax_gap.net_compliance_rate verified | 86.9 percent | — | —Net Compliance Rate: 86.9% |
| expenditures.tax_gap.is_current verified | true | — | —Fall of calendar year 2025—new tax gap estimates and projections (delayed) |
| expenditures.tax_gap.composition | — | —Nonfiling: $63 billion (9% of gross) / Underreporting: $539 billion (77% of gross) / Underpayment: $94 billion (14% of gross) | |
| expenditures.tax_gap.composition.nonfiling | 63 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.tax_gap.composition.underreporting | 539 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.tax_gap.composition.underpayment | 94 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.tax_gap.composition.individual_income_underreporting | 381 | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.tax_gap.visibility_ladder | — | —Items Subject to Substantial Information Reporting and Withholding $9 1% 2% | Items Subject to Substantial Information Reporting $22 3% 6% | Items Subject to Some Information Reporting $71 10% 19% | Items Subject to Little or No Information Reporting $179 26% 47% | |
| expenditures.tax_gap.visibility_ladder.nonfarm_proprietor | 117 | — | —$117 billion in underreporting, comprising 17% of the gross tax gap and 31% of individual income tax underreporting |
| expenditures.tax_gap.top_1pct_share unsourced | not shipped | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.tax_gap.top_1pct_share.use_this_instead | 160 usd_billions | annual, TY2019 base | Treasury (Natasha Sarin), The Case for a Robust Attack on the Tax Gap (primary)more than $160 billion lost annually is from taxes that top 1 percent choose not to pay |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.carried_interest.jct_2015 | 15.6 usd_billions | ~2016-2025 baseline: pre-tcja | Sen. Baldwin's office quoting JCT (secondary)$15.6 billion in revenue |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.carried_interest.yale_2026 | 87.7 usd_billions | 10 years baseline: post-obbba | The Budget Lab at Yale, Refining Revenue Estimates: Taxing Carried Interest (primary)revenue of $87.7 billion over 10 years |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.mega_roth.jct_count corrected | 28000 taxpayers | TY2019 | Senate Finance Committee release of JCT data (primary)more than 28,000 taxpayers had aggregate IRA account balances of $5 million or more |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.crypto_wash_sales verified | 16.8 usd_billions | 2021 vintage baseline: pre-obbba | Tax Policy Center Briefing Book citing JCT (secondary)the proposed wash-sale restrictions would raise $16.8 billion over a decade |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.crypto_wash_sales.still_open | true | — | sourcecrypto and other such digital assets are exempt, hence why many consider it a 'loophole' |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.profit_shifting.global verified | 1000 usd_billions | 2022 | EU Tax Observatory, Global Tax Evasion Report 2024 (primary)$1 trillion in profits booked in tax havens ... 35% of all the profits booked by multinational companies outside of their headquarter country ... The equivalent of nearly 10% of corporate tax revenue collected globally. |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.profit_shifting.us_federal_loss unsourced | not shipped | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.itep_corporate_effective_rates verified | 2018-2022 | ITEP, Corporate Tax Avoidance in the First Five Years of the Trump Tax Law (primary)342 companies included in this study paid an average effective income tax rate of just 14.1 percent | |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.camt.scored corrected | 222.2 usd_billions | FY2023-FY2031 | CRS R47328, The 15% Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (reporting JCT's score) (primary)The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that the CAMT will generate additional revenues of $222.2 billion from FY2023 through FY2031. |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.camt.realized verified_negative | not shipped | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.buyback_excise.scored verified | 74 usd_billions | FY2022-FY2031 | CRS R47397, The 1% Excise Tax on Stock Repurchases (reporting JCT's score) (primary)$74 billion over the FY2022-FY2031 period |
| expenditures.avoidance_mechanics.buyback_excise.realized needs_human_confirmation | 8.5 usd_billions | FY2025 | CBO, Federal Excise Tax Revenues, Figure 2 (primary)Tobacco tax: $9.5 billion / Tax on corporate stock repurchases: $8.5 billion / Alcohol tax: $8.1 billion / Other excise taxes: $6.5 billion |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.retirement_savings verified | 355 usd_billions | FY2026 | CRFB quoting JCX-45-25 (secondary)Exclusion for Retirement Savings and Pension Contributions | $355 billion |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.retirement_savings.conv_repeal not_applicable | not shipped | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.preferential_capital_gains_dividends verified | 252 usd_billions | FY2026 | — (secondary)Lower Rates for Dividends and Long-Term Capital Gains | $252 billion |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.employer_health_exclusion_income verified | 240 usd_billions | FY2026 | — (secondary)Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance | $240 billion |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.employer_health_exclusion_payroll unsourced | not shipped | — | JCT, JCX-45-25 (primary)Thus, for example, the income tax exclusion for employer-paid health insurance is included, but the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA") tax exclusion for employer-paid health insurance is not treated as a tax expenditure in this report. |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.stepped_up_basis verified | 73 usd_billions | FY2026 | — (secondary)"Stepped-Up Basis" for Capital Gains at Death | $73 billion |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.section_199a verified | 76 usd_billions | FY2026 | — (secondary)Pass-Through Business Income Deduction | $76 billion |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.charitable_deduction verified | 78 usd_billions | FY2026 | — (secondary)Charitable Contributions Deduction | $78 billion |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.salt_deduction verified | 60 usd_billions | FY2026 | — (secondary)State and Local Tax Deduction | $60 billion |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.mortgage_interest verified | 261.1 usd_billions | FY2025-2029 | Novogradac quoting JCX-45-25 (secondary)$261.1 billion over 2025 to 2029 |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.opportunity_zones verified | 7.8 usd_billions | FY2025-2029 | Novogradac quoting JCX-45-25 (secondary)$7.8 billion |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.municipal_bond_interest blocked | not shipped | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| expenditures.static_expenditures.like_kind_exchanges_1031 blocked | not shipped | — | —no verbatim line stored |
Every scenario-card figure
Each figure on a card in Act 3, with the sentence it was read from. The card itself shows the value, the period and the attribution; the quotes are here.
| Datum | Value | Period | Source and the line it was read from |
|---|---|---|---|
| You are here — what current law already does · evidence: strong (official CBO score of enacted law) | |||
| Added to the deficit scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.deficit_effect.value | 3400 usd_billions | 2025-2034 baseline: post-obbba (this IS the OBBBA score) | CBOCBO estimates that Public Law 119-21 will result in a net increase in the unified budget deficit totaling $3.4 trillion over the 2025-2034 period |
| Lowest decile, share of resources lost scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.distribution.verified.bottom_decile_pct | 3.9 percent | AVERAGE over 2026-2034 | CBOResources for households in the lowest decile of the income distribution would decrease by about $1,600 per year (in 2025 dollars)…That amounts to 3.9 percent of their income |
| Lowest decile, dollars a year scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.distribution.verified.bottom_decile_dollars | -1600 usd_2025 | AVERAGE over 2026-2034 | CBOno verbatim line stored |
| Highest decile, share of resources gained scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.distribution.verified.top_decile_pct | 2.3 percent | AVERAGE over 2026-2034 | CBOResources would increase, on average, over the projection period by about $12,000 for households in the highest decile, amounting to 2.3 percent of their projected income. |
| Highest decile, dollars a year scenarios.json → obbba_baseline.distribution.verified.top_decile_dollars | 12000 usd_2025 | AVERAGE over 2026-2034 | CBOno verbatim line stored |
| Close the big loopholes · evidence: moderate | |||
| Tax gains at death expenditures.json → conv_scores.tax_gains_at_death.value | 536.1 usd_billions | FY2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | CBO Budget Option 51 (Dec 2024)no verbatim line stored |
| Tax carried interest as ordinary income expenditures.json → avoidance_mechanics.carried_interest.yale_2026.value | 87.7 usd_billions | 10 years (2026 vintage) baseline: post-obbba | Yale Budget Lab (May 2026)no verbatim line stored |
| Repeal the 199A pass-through deduction expenditures.json → conv_scores.repeal_199a.value | 835.7 usd_billions | 2027-2036 baseline: post-obbba | Tax Foundation 2026 Options Guideno verbatim line stored |
| Limit or eliminate itemized deductions — CBO’s range, low end expenditures.json → conv_scores.eliminate_itemized_deductions.value_range.0 | 736 usd_billions | FY2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | CBO Budget Option 49 (Dec 2024)no verbatim line stored |
| Limit or eliminate itemized deductions — CBO’s range, high end expenditures.json → conv_scores.eliminate_itemized_deductions.value_range.1 | 3424 usd_billions | FY2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | CBO Budget Option 49 (Dec 2024)Option 49. Eliminate or Limit Itemized Deductions | 736 to 3,424 |
| Revenue lost to the IRS cuts already made expenditures.json → enforcement.yale_total_revenue_loss.value | 860 usd_billions | 2026-2035 baseline: post-obbba | Yale Budget Lab (Apr 2026)no verbatim line stored |
| Tax the ultra-wealthy: a 70% rate above $10 million · evidence: contested | |||
| Tax Foundation, ordinary income only, conventional scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.0.value | 291.7 usd_billions | 2019-2028 baseline: pre-obbba | Tax Foundationno verbatim line stored |
| Tax Foundation, ordinary income only, dynamic scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.1.value | 189.1 usd_billions | 2019-2028 baseline: pre-obbba | Tax Foundationno verbatim line stored |
| Tax Foundation, INCLUDING capital gains, conventional scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.2.value | 51.4 usd_billions | 2019-2028 baseline: pre-obbba | Tax Foundationno verbatim line stored |
| Tax Foundation, INCLUDING capital gains, dynamic scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.3.value | -63.5 usd_billions | 2019-2028 baseline: pre-obbba | Tax Foundationno verbatim line stored |
| Penn Wharton, static scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.4.value | 382.3 usd_billions | 2020-2029 baseline: pre-obbba | Penn Wharton Budget Modelno verbatim line stored |
| Penn Wharton, business income shifting, full deferral scenarios.json → seventy_percent_top_rate.estimates.7.value | 163.8 usd_billions | 2020-2029 baseline: pre-obbba | Penn Wharton Budget Modelno verbatim line stored |
| Tax wealth, not just income · evidence: contested | |||
| Saez & Zucman, 2% above $50M plus 1% above $1B scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.0.value | 2750 usd_billions | 2019-2028 | Saez & Zucman (Jan 2019)the tax would raise around $2.75 trillion over the ten-year budget window 2019-2028 ... about 75,000 American households (less than 0.1%) |
| Penn Wharton, conventional, matched 2023-2032 window scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.1.conventional_2023_2032 | 2700 usd_billions | 2023-2032 | Penn Wharton Budget Model (Mar 2021)no verbatim line stored |
| Penn Wharton, conventional, standard 2022-2031 window scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.1.conventional_2022_2031 | 2100 usd_billions | 2022-2031 | Penn Wharton Budget Model (Mar 2021)2.1 trillion over the standard 10-year budget window (2022-2031) |
| Summers & Sarin, annual, low end scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.2.annual_range.0 | 25 usd_billions_per_year | per year, no ten-year total published | Summers & Sarin (Jun 2019)$25 billion is a rough back-of-the-envelope number |
| Summers & Sarin, annual, high end scenarios.json → wealth_tax.warren.estimates.2.annual_range.1 | 75 usd_billions_per_year | per year, no ten-year total published | Summers & Sarin (Jun 2019)We would be surprised if the $25-billion-a-year figure we suggest was not a significant underestimate. |
| Norway, wealth-tax revenue in 2022 scenarios.json → wealth_tax.international_track_record.norway.revenue.2022 | 27 billion_kroner | 2022 | AFP wire report off Norwegian government figuresno verbatim line stored |
| Norway, wealth-tax revenue in 2025 (estimated) scenarios.json → wealth_tax.international_track_record.norway.revenue.2025 | 34 billion_kroner | 2025 (estimated) | AFP wire report off Norwegian government figuresno verbatim line stored |
| Norway, multimillionaires and billionaires who left for Switzerland scenarios.json → wealth_tax.international_track_record.norway.emigration.value | 300 count | by 2024 | AFP wire reportno verbatim line stored |
| Switzerland, wealth-tax revenue scenarios.json → wealth_tax.international_track_record.switzerland.value | 1 percent_of_gdp | as reported 2019 | OECD via PolitiFactSwitzerland reaps far more than other nations, taking in revenues equal to 1% of GDP. |
| Switch to a flat tax · evidence: strong scoring, stale baseline | |||
| Ten-year revenue effect of the Cruz plan scenarios.json → flat_tax.revenue.value | -8600 usd_billions | 2016-2026 baseline: pre-tcja AND pre-obbba (DOUBLY STALE) | Tax Policy Center (Feb 2016)It would cut taxes by an average of about $6,100, or about 8.5 percent of after-tax income. On average, households at all income levels would receive tax cuts, but the highest-income households would receive the largest cuts, both in dollars and as a percentage of income. |
| Lowest quintile, change in after-tax income scenarios.json → flat_tax.distribution.table.0.pct_change_after_tax_income | 0.4 percent | calendar year 2017 (a single-year snapshot, NOT the 10-year window) | Tax Policy Centerno verbatim line stored |
| Middle quintile, change in after-tax income scenarios.json → flat_tax.distribution.table.2.pct_change_after_tax_income | 3.2 percent | calendar year 2017 (a single-year snapshot, NOT the 10-year window) | Tax Policy Centerno verbatim line stored |
| Top 1 percent, change in after-tax income scenarios.json → flat_tax.distribution.table.5.pct_change_after_tax_income | 26 percent | calendar year 2017 (a single-year snapshot, NOT the 10-year window) | Tax Policy Centerno verbatim line stored |
| Top 0.1 percent, change in after-tax income scenarios.json → flat_tax.distribution.table.6.pct_change_after_tax_income | 29 percent | calendar year 2017 (a single-year snapshot, NOT the 10-year window) | Tax Policy Centerno verbatim line stored |
| Replace the income tax with a national sales tax (FairTax, H.R. 25) · evidence: moderate (rate analyses are robust; distributional detail is thin and dated) | |||
| Legislated rate, tax-inclusive framing scenarios.json → fairtax.rate_framing.tax_inclusive | 23 percent | H.R. 25 as introduced | the bill textno verbatim line stored |
| The same rate, tax-exclusive framing scenarios.json → fairtax.rate_framing.tax_exclusive | 30 percent | H.R. 25 as introduced | the bill textno verbatim line stored |
| Revenue-neutral rate, tax-inclusive scenarios.json → fairtax.revenue_neutral_rate.gale_pomerleau.1.inclusive | 34.1 percent | as scored | Gale / Pomerleauno verbatim line stored |
| Revenue-neutral rate, tax-exclusive scenarios.json → fairtax.revenue_neutral_rate.gale_pomerleau.1.exclusive | 51.7 percent | as scored | Gale / Pomerleauno verbatim line stored |
| Share of the federal tax burden borne by the bottom 80%, today scenarios.json → fairtax.distribution.table.0.share_of_federal_income_taxes_current | 15.8 percent | as scored | as recorded in scenarios.jsonno verbatim line stored |
| Share of the federal tax burden borne by the bottom 80% under the FairTax scenarios.json → fairtax.distribution.table.0.share_of_federal_sales_taxes_nrst | 34.9 percent | as scored | as recorded in scenarios.jsonno verbatim line stored |
| Fund the IRS · evidence: strong on direction, contested on magnitude | |||
| Return per dollar spent auditing above the 90th percentile expenditures.json → enforcement.audit_roi.value | 12 ratio | TY2010-2014 audits, published 2023 | Boning, Hendren, Sprung-Keyser & Stuartno verbatim line stored |
| Revenue lost to the IRS cuts already made expenditures.json → enforcement.yale_total_revenue_loss.value | 860 usd_billions | 2026-2035 baseline: post-obbba | Yale Budget Lab (Apr 2026)no verbatim line stored |
| Revenue lost to a $20 billion rescission expenditures.json → enforcement.cbo_rescission.revenue_loss | 44 usd_billions | 2024-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | CBO (Feb 2024)no verbatim line stored |
| Gross tax gap expenditures.json → tax_gap.gross.value | 696 usd_billions | TY2022 | IRS Publication 5869 (Oct 2024)Gross Tax Gap: $696 billion |
| Scrap the Social Security payroll cap · evidence: strong (mechanical) | |||
| CBO: apply the tax to earnings above $250,000 scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.cbo_options.alternatives.1.value | 1426.8 usd_billions | 2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | CBO Budget Option 60955 (Dec 2024)no verbatim line stored |
| CBO: raise the taxable share of earnings to 90 percent scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.cbo_options.alternatives.0.value | 727.6 usd_billions | 2025-2034 baseline: pre-obbba | CBO Budget Option 60955 (Dec 2024)no verbatim line stored |
| SSA E2.1 — no benefit credit: share of the 75-year shortfall closed scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.ssa_solvency.provisions.0.pct_of_deficit_closed | 67 percent | 2025 Trustees Report basis, 75-year long-range period | SSA Office of the Chief Actuaryno verbatim line stored |
| SSA E2.2 — with benefit credit: share of the 75-year shortfall closed scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.ssa_solvency.provisions.1.pct_of_deficit_closed | 48 percent | 2025 Trustees Report basis, 75-year long-range period | SSA Office of the Chief Actuaryno verbatim line stored |
| The 2026 taxable maximum scenarios.json → scrap_the_payroll_cap.current_cap.2026 | 184500 usd | 2026 | SSA Office of the Chief Actuary2026 | $184,500 |
| Bring back the 2021 Child Tax Credit · evidence: strong on the poverty effect, contested on employment | |||
| What JCT scored the one-year expansion at scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.cost.value | 109.5 usd_billions | FY2021-2031 (a one-year policy; essentially all of the cost lands in FY2021-2022) baseline: pre-obbba | JCT, via the American Action Forumthe Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that these expansions and modifications to the CTC will cost $109.5 billion over the next decade. |
| Child poverty (SPM) in 2020, before the expansion scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.0.value | 9.7 percent | 2020 | U.S. Census BureauChild poverty, calculated by the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), fell to its lowest recorded level in 2021, declining 46% from 9.7% in 2020 to 5.2% in 2021 |
| Child poverty (SPM) in 2021, with the expansion scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.1.value | 5.2 percent | 2021 | U.S. Census Bureauthe national child SPM rate was its lowest ever at 5.2% |
| Child poverty (SPM) in 2022, after it lapsed scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.2.value | 12.4 percent | 2022 | U.S. Census BureauThe rate increased to 12.4% in 2022 |
| Child poverty (SPM) in 2023 scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.3.value | 13.7 percent | 2023 | U.S. Census Bureauand 13.7% in 2023 |
| Child poverty (SPM) in 2024 scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.child_poverty_series.points.4.value | 13.4 percent | 2024 | ITEP (secondary)13.4 percent of children living in poverty |
| The credit today scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.current_law.amount.value | 2200 usd | TY2026 | IRS Revenue Procedure 2025-32the maximum amount of the credit allowed under § 24(a) is $2,200 |
| How much of it a family with no tax liability can actually receive scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.current_law.refundable.value | 1700 usd | TY2026 | IRS Revenue Procedure 2025-32the amount used in § 24(d)(1)(A) to determine the amount of the credit under § 24 that may be refundable is $1,700 |
| Corinth, Meyer, Stadnicki & Wu: predicted fall in employment scenarios.json → restore_2021_ctc.employment_dispute.predicted.value | 1.5 millions_of_workers | a permanent child allowance | Corinth, Meyer, Stadnicki & Wu (simulation)By eliminating the strong work incentives in the previous CTC, we estimate that the proposal would reduce employment by approximately 1.5 million workers, which would diminish the proposal's effect on child poverty and eliminate its effect on deep child poverty altogether. |
| Housing vouchers for everyone who qualifies · evidence: strong | |||
| Extra annual cost of serving everyone eligible scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.cost.value | 118 usd_billions | 2022 (simulated) | Urban Institute (Aug 2023)We estimate that providing subsidies to all who are eligible would increase the total amount of subsidies paid by $118 billion, to a total of $168 billion. |
| People moved above the poverty line scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.poverty_effect.people_lifted.value | 6.4 millions_of_people | 2022 (simulated) | Urban Institute (Aug 2023)The reduction in the rate from 14.7 percent to 12.8 percent amounts to 6.4 million people moving from below poverty to above poverty because of the increased resources from housing subsidies. |
| Poverty rate now scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.poverty_effect.spm_rate_before.value | 14.7 percent | 2022 (simulated) | Urban Institute (Aug 2023)We estimate that at current levels of housing assistance, 14.7 percent of the population is below the SPM poverty level |
| Poverty rate with vouchers for all who qualify scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.poverty_effect.spm_rate_after.value | 12.8 percent | 2022 (simulated) | Urban Institute (Aug 2023)the poverty rate would fall to 12.8 percent with full funding and use of housing vouchers |
| Share of eligible households served today scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.coverage_gap.share_served.value | 25 percent | 2022 (simulated) | Urban Institute (Aug 2023)We estimate that about 25 percent of households eligible for housing assistance currently receive it. |
| Households assisted today scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.coverage_gap.households.current | 4.4 millions_of_households | 2022 (simulated) | Urban Institute (Aug 2023)About 4.4 million households currently receive housing assistance and we estimate that this would increase by 13.2 million to a total of 17.6 million with full funding and use of housing vouchers. |
| Households assisted if everyone eligible were served scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.coverage_gap.households.total | 17.6 millions_of_households | 2022 (simulated) | Urban Institute (Aug 2023)About 4.4 million households currently receive housing assistance and we estimate that this would increase by 13.2 million to a total of 17.6 million with full funding and use of housing vouchers. |
| Families offered a long-term subsidy who used a shelter, months 21-32 scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.causal_evidence.rates.long_term_rent_subsidy | 4.4 percent | 37 months after random assignment | Gubits et al., JPAM 2018 (randomised trial)The offer of a long-term rent subsidy reduced use of emergency shelters in months 21 to 32 after random assignment by more than three-quarters |
| Families offered usual care who used a shelter, months 21-32 scenarios.json → housing_vouchers.causal_evidence.rates.usual_care | 18.8 percent | 37 months after random assignment | Gubits et al., JPAM 2018 (randomised trial)The offer of a long-term rent subsidy reduced use of emergency shelters in months 21 to 32 after random assignment by more than three-quarters |
| A carbon tax with a per-person dividend · evidence: strong on incidence, weak on political durability | |||
| Opening rate scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.structure.opening_rate | 49 usd_per_metric_ton_co2e | 2019 in Treasury’s modelled schedule | U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115a carbon tax that started at $49 per metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (mt CO2-e) in 2019 and increased to $70 in 2028 |
| Rate by 2028 scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.structure.rate_2028 | 70 usd_per_metric_ton_co2e | 2028 in Treasury’s modelled schedule | U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115a carbon tax that started at $49 per metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (mt CO2-e) in 2019 and increased to $70 in 2028 |
| Gross revenue scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.gross_revenue.value | 2962 usd_billions | 2019-2028 baseline: pre-obbba | U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115$2,962 billion |
| Poorest decile, change in after-tax income WITH the rebate scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.incidence.with_rebate.poorest_decile | 9 percent | as modelled, WP-115 | U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115The TDM estimates that the poorest decile would experience almost a 9 percent increase in average after-tax income compared to a 1 percent decrease in average after-tax income for the top income decile. |
| Top decile, change in after-tax income WITH the rebate scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.incidence.with_rebate.top_decile | -1 percent | as modelled, WP-115 | U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115The TDM estimates that the poorest decile would experience almost a 9 percent increase in average after-tax income compared to a 1 percent decrease in average after-tax income for the top income decile. |
| Lowest decile, change in after-tax income from the tax ALONE scenarios.json → carbon_tax_and_dividend.incidence.tax_alone_no_rebate.lowest_decile | -0.8 percent | as modelled, WP-115 | U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, WP-115The lowest income decile is estimated to have a 0.8 percent decrease in after-tax income because of the carbon tax and the magnitude of this percentage change in after-tax income rises with income through the 9th decile. |
| The 1986 model: broaden the base, lower the rates · evidence: strong on what happened, contested as a template | |||
| Top individual rate before scenarios.json → tra86_model.rates.individual_top.from | 50 percent | 1986 | CRFBreducing the top individual rate from 50 to 28 percent |
| Top individual rate after scenarios.json → tra86_model.rates.individual_top.to | 28 percent | 1988 | CRFBreducing the top individual rate from 50 to 28 percent |
| Top corporate rate before scenarios.json → tra86_model.rates.corporate_top.from | 46 percent | 1979-1986 | CRFBthe top corporate rate from 46 to 34 percent |
| Top corporate rate after scenarios.json → tra86_model.rates.corporate_top.to | 34 percent | 1988-1992 | CRFBthe top corporate rate from 46 to 34 percent |
| Size of the swap: individuals cut, corporations raised scenarios.json → tra86_model.revenue_neutrality.value | 120 usd_billions | five years from enactment | CRFBOverall, the Act was revenue-neutral, with the individual tax system receiving a $120 billion tax cut over five years and the corporate side getting a $120 billion tax increase |
The Act 1 honesty notes, and what backs them
Two of the nine causal-honesty notes attached to the history charts shipped in an earlier build carrying a visible “pending re-verification” flag, and the California Proposition 30 counter-experiment was named beside the Kansas one without figures. All three were closed on 18 August 2026 and their sources are below.
| Datum | Value | Period | Source and the line it was read from |
|---|---|---|---|
| act1-notes.note_8_rates_and_top_shares.citations.0 | 18 OECD countries, post-1960 changes in top marginal rates | Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 'Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities', American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6(1), 230-271 (primary)Top tax rate cuts are associated with top one percent pretax income shares increases but not higher economic growth. | |
| act1-notes.note_8_rates_and_top_shares.citations.1 | 18 OECD countries, 1965-2015 | David Hope & Julian Limberg, 'The economic consequences of major tax cuts for the rich', Socio-Economic Review 20(2), 539-559 (primary)We find tax cuts for the rich lead to higher income inequality in both the short- and medium-term. In contrast, such reforms do not have any significant effect on economic growth or unemployment. | |
| act1-notes.note_8_rates_and_top_shares.citations.2 | United States, 1945-2010 | Thomas L. Hungerford, Congressional Research Service report R42729, 'Taxes and the Economy: An Economic Analysis of the Top Tax Rates Since 1945' (primary)changes over the past 65 years in the top marginal tax rate and the top capital gains tax rate do not appear correlated with economic growth | |
| act1-notes.note_8_rates_and_top_shares.critique verified | — | Tax Foundation, 'Retracted CRS Report on Taxes and Growth Flawed, But Still Cited' (Stephen J. Entin) (primary)looking only at the first year effect throws out about 95 percent of the outcome | |
| act1-notes.note_9_1950s_caveats.figures_it_displays.1 verified | 28.3 percent | — | —no verbatim line stored |
| act1-notes.prop_30_counter_experiment.estimates.0 | California, 2013-2014 | 'Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California', American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 16(1), 34-86 (primary)An additional 0.8 percent of the residential tax base that landed in the top bracket left California in 2013. | |
| act1-notes.prop_30_counter_experiment.estimates.1 | California, 2013-2014 | 'Millionaire Migration in California: Administrative Data for Three Waves of Tax Reform', Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality with the California Franchise Tax Board (primary)For each 1 point increase in the tax rate, we find that the net migration rate decreases 0.8 per thousand population |
What could not be retrieved
17 claims from the project’s own research notes could not be traced to a source and are therefore not displayed anywhere in the tool. 2 of the 9 items that once blocked a deliverable are still open; 7 were closed when the source spreadsheets were obtained.
Still open
- B5 — Three static calculations validated against PolicyEngine: top rate +2pp, capital gains +5pp, 199A repeal.
PolicyEngine's REST API requires an HTTP POST to create a parameterized reform, which this build environment could not issue. The one stored policy matching a target reform (id 32979, capital gains 23.8%→28.8%) returned status 'computing' on every poll and never resolved. GET /us/metadata exceeds 48MB and cannot be retrieved, so parameter paths could not be confirmed either.
What closes it: Run the policyengine-us Python package locally — it executes the same model without the async queue, the auth, or the 48MB metadata blob. Alternatively, POST to create each policy and poll the GET economy endpoint: POST https://api.policyengine.org/us/policy with {"label":"...","data":{<param>:{"2026-01-01.2035-12-31":<value>}}} then GET https://api.policyengine.org/us/economy/{new_id}/over/2?region=us&time_period=2026 until status != computing - B8 — Absolute mobility by birth cohort, the full cohort-by-cohort array.
Opportunity Insights publishes it only as .dta and .xlsx; the Harvard Dataverse mirror is robots-disallowed; the paper shows it in Figure 1B only.
Claims that must not ship, and why
- CBO scored TCJA at ~-$2.3T including debt service
- Muni bond tax expenditure ~$30-40B/yr; closing new issues raises ~$100-120B/10yr
- Section 1031 like-kind exchanges ~$9-10B/yr
- 199A repeal raises ~$700B/10yr
- Employer health exclusion payroll side ~$120-150B
- Top 1% accounts for ~28% of unreported income and ~36% of unpaid tax (NBER w28542)
- US profit-shifting revenue loss ~$60B/yr (Torslov-Wier-Zucman)
- Summers-Sarin scored the Warren wealth tax at ~$1.1T/10yr
- OECD net wealth taxes fell from 12 countries in 1990 to 3-4 by 2018
- Wyden mark-to-market would cover ~700 taxpayers
- US tax-to-GDP ratio is 25.2% (2023)
- Home price-to-income ratio was 2.2-3.0 from 1950-1985
- Kansas lost ~$700M/yr in revenue
- About 2% of deaths were subject to estate tax in 2000
- Federal Reserve remittances, FY2025 dollar level
- JCT's $451B gross macroeconomic feedback figure for TCJA
- Union density was ~33% in the 1950s
The data files themselves
Every figure in the tool resolves to one of these. They are plain JSON and each datum carries its own value, unit, period, status, source, URL and verbatim quote.
| File | Size | What is in it |
|---|---|---|
| baseline-fy2025.json | 16.2 KB | Current-law fiscal baseline: receipts by source, outlays, deficit, GDP. |
| history-series.json | 64.0 KB | Act 1 chart series: statutory and effective rates 1913–2026, distribution, mobility, cost of living. |
| series-arrays.json | 145.7 KB | The long-run year-by-year arrays behind the history charts. |
| parameters.json | 42.5 KB | Behavioural dials: elasticities, multipliers, spending propensities, incidence, macro feedback. |
| expenditures.json | 46.2 KB | Tax expenditures, repeal scores, distributional shares, avoidance mechanics, the tax gap, enforcement. |
| scenarios.json | 68.5 KB | Act 3 scenario cards: every score, and both sides of every dispute. |
| cbo-distribution.json | 191.8 KB | CBO’s household income and tax distribution, 1979–2022. |
| soi-table-3-5.json | 16.3 KB | IRS Statistics of Income Table 3.5 for tax year 2023 — the static base for every computed rate change. |
| soi-percentiles.json | 26.0 KB | IRS percentile thresholds and average rates. |
| act1-notes.json | 9.7 KB | Sources for the Act 1 causal-honesty notes, and both sides of the California Proposition 30 counter-experiment. |
| blocked.json | 24.9 KB | What could not be retrieved, and exactly what would close each item. |
Freshness
Figures are as of the fiscal years and windows shown. This page is reviewed when major tax legislation passes, not on a schedule. It carries no provider listings and is outside the weekly resource-verification cycle.